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OF TEXTUALISM, PARTY AUTONOMY, AND GOOD FAITH
MICHAEL P. VAN ALSTn*
INTRODUCTION
"[I]t is possible to so draw a contract as to leave decisions
absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the parties
and in such a case the issue of good faith is irrelevant." But
the trick is to tell when a contract has been so drawn-and
surely the mere recitation of an express power is not always
the test. Sometimes it may suffice .... But to say that every
expressly conferred contractual power is of this nature is vir-
tually to read the doctrine of good faith.., out of existence.1
This observation of Justice (then Judge) Antonin Scalia about
the force of good faith in contractual relations, though clearly in-
tended to be rhetorical, in recent years has come to be almost
prophetic. Paralleling a renewed emphasis on formalism in the
interpretation of other legal texts-most notably, statutes2 and
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1. Tymshare, Inc. v. Coveli, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.)
(quoting MacDougald Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 188 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1972)). For an analysis of Justice Scalia's own limited view of the duty of
good faith as reflected in the Tymshare opinion, see discussion infra note 193.
2. The subject of statutory interpretation has spawned some of the most spirited
debates of modem American legal scholarship. For critical examinations of the re-
turn of formalism in this interpretive context, see Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability
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treaties-the 1990s have witnessed the rise of a new textualist
approach to the contractual duty of good faith as well. In its ex-
treme form, this view holds that every expressly conferred con-
tractual power is presumptively absolute and unrestricted. Be-
cause the parties' writing reflects the sole repository of interpre-
tive evidence, the textualist logic runs, every such express power
renders altogether irrelevant any "implied" notions of "good
faith" and "fair dealing."
Indeed, recent textualist courts have voiced irritation over
suggestions to the contrary. "More often than we care to recall,"
the Seventh Circuit admonished a plaintiff in a recent opinion,
"we have reminded litigants that... [they] may not seek to liti-
gate issues of 'good faith' in lieu of abiding by explicit provisions
of contracts."4 As Justice Scalia warned only fifteen years ago,5
this modern celebration of the authority of text threatens to con-
sign the doctrine of good faith to an inconsequential marginal
note in the law of contracts.
This renewed assault by the forces of formalism in contract
should not come as a surprise. The duty of good faith in the
performance and enforcement of contracts is now a familiar
of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invita-
tion to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUm. L. REV.
749 (1995). For an introduction to the broader debate over statutory interpretation,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Prac-
tical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); W. David Slawson, Legislative History
and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 383 (1992).
3. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 953, 963-64 (1994) (analyzing the influence of the new formalism on treaty
interpretation); Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 687, 722-26 (1998) (same).
4. L.A.P.D., Inc. v. General Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997).
5. There is no small amount of irony here. The principal champion of a
textualist approach to the interpretation of statutes and treaties, of course, is Justice
Scalia himself. See ANTONiN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CouRTS AND
THE LAW 16-35 (1997) (discussing the propriety of reliance on text in interpretive
inquiries); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, 'Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Juris-
prudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 401, 432-39
(1994) (analyzing Justice Scalia's textualist views on statutory interpretation); Van
Alstine, supra note 3, at 722-26 (discussing Justice Scalia's views on treaty interpre-
tation).
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feature in our legal landscape.6 Throughout its history, however,
the doctrine has served as a focal point for controversy in the
law of contracts.7 This is so because it stands uneasily at the
crossroads of two inherent tensions in the law. The first arises
from the competing goals of providing determinate rules to en-
sure certainty in the contracting process, while at the same time
preserving sufficient flexibility to accommodate the complexity of
human interaction. The second tension involves the closely
related, but equally contentious, conflict between party autono-
my and party heteronomy. At issue in this dimension is the need
to reconcile the power of private parties to define for themselves
the scope of their obligations with the role of the state in impos-
ing minimal standards of honesty and fairness in the process.9
6. The duty of good faith has found express acceptance in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and now the common law of nearly
all of the states. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995) ("Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); see also
infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the broad acceptance
of the duty of good faith in the UCC and the common law of contracts). The con-
tractual duty of good faith also has inspired a substantial body of scholarly work,
the significance of which for the rise of the new textualism I analyze in detail be-
low. See infra notes 103-29 and accompanying text.
7. Professor Robert Braucher, one of the most influential scholars of his time,
observed at the close of the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code that the duty
of good faith "produced more controversy and comment than most other questions
affecting the Code pervasively." Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 814 (1958). For a more recent obser-
vation in the same vein, see Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Con-
tract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1178 (1995) ("Easily the most interesting and impor-
tant implied term in modern American contract law is good faith. .. ").
8. Compare Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990) (noting that reading good faith as a broad obligation of reasonable
conduct "would reduce commercial certainty and breed costly litigation"), and
Shawmut Bank Conn., N.A. v. Chorches, No. CV95-57587-5, 1995 WL 548716, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1995) (same), with Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell,
512 So. 2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987) (describing the duty of good faith as "the obligation
to preserve the spirit of the bargain rather than the form"), and Fisher v. Toombs
County Nursing Home, 479 S.E.2d 180, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("'Good faith' is a
shorthand way of saying substantial compliance with the spirit, and not merely the
letter, of a contract.").
9. Compare Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cook-
ies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing with regard to the duty of
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These tensions find their most challenging practical expres-
sion when the intangible notion of "good faith" collides with the
apparent force of an express contractual term. Unfortunately,
the law provides only cryptic guidance on the proper resolution
of this conflict. It is now commonly recognized that the duty of
good faith is "imposed" in every contract, 10 and cannot be dis-
claimed, even by express stipulation." The duty thus applies as
a matter of law and without the need for any affirmative action
by the parties,12 or, in more fashionable terminology, is an "im-
mutable" rule of contract law.'
3
good faith that "[c]ontract law does not require parties to behave altruistically to-
ward each other; it does not proceed on the philosophy that I am my brother's keep-
er"), and Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (The
contractual duty of good faith is ... not some newfangled bit of welfare-state pater-
nalism or the sediment of an altruistic strain in contract law . . . .") (citation omit-
ted), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (asserting that the duty
of good faith forbids conduct that "violate[s] community standards of decency, fair-
ness or reasonableness"), and Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982)
(arguing that good faith "is of a piece with explicit requirements of 'contractual mo-
rality' such as the unconscionability doctrine and various general equitable princi-
ples").
10. For the limited exceptions to this rule, see infra note 79.
11. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ('[The obligationg of good faith .. .prescribed by this
Act may not be disclaimed by agreement . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (stipulating that the duty of good faith is "imposeld]" in every contract); see
also Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d
445, 450 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (""While it is true that courts impose an obliga-
tion of good faith in every aspect of the contractual relationship . . . the obligation
of good faith is 'constructive' rather than 'implied' because the obligation is imposed
by law and cannot be disclaimed.").
12. See, e.g., Maher v. Associated Milk Producers, No. 94-5035, 1995 WL 34847, at
*2 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 1995) ("[The] implied covenant [of good faith] is automatically
present in every contract, regardless of what the parties may have intended.");
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that "the
obligations stemming from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are
imposed by law"); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 499 (Colo. 1995) (holding
that the duty of good faith applied in a contract notwithstanding an express provi-
sion that excluded all implied covenants).
13. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (describing "immutable"
rules as ones that 'cannot be contracted around" and noting that "under the Uni-
form Commercial Code ... the duty to act in good faith is an immutable part of
any contract"); Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract
Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. REV. 235, 237 n.6 (1993) (describing the duty of good
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This is a rather awkward immutable rule, however. For in al-
most the same conceptual breath, the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC or "the Code"), for example, makes the "non-disclaimable"
obligation of good faith subject to "standards" the parties may
define by "agreement."'4 In other words, at some ill-defined level
the force of good faith is indeed subject to the power of party
autonomy. The precise interaction of the duty of good faith with
express contract language thus remains an important jurispru-
dential mystery.15
The new textualist 16 approach offers a deceptively simple
answer to this mystery: When the parties to a contractual rela-
tionship reduce their agreement to a writing, the office of the
law is simply to enforce the express terms as written. In the
terse prose of Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit,
transactors are entitled to literal enforcement of their contracts,
"even to the great discomfort of their trading partners, without
being mulcted for lack of 'good faith.'"1
7
This Article demonstrates that this new textualist trend mis-
apprehends the role of good faith in contractual relationships.
faith as an "immutable ruleg" of contract law).
14. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (stating that "the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of [good faith] is to be measured"). For its
part, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts fails to provide any explicit guidance on
this matter. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
15. Indeed, a recent comprehensive commentary on the duty of good faith issued
by the Uniform Commercial Code's Permanent Editorial Board astonishingly fails to
mention section 1-102(3) at all. See PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, FINAL DRAFt, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) (Feb. 10,
1994) [hereinafter PEB COMM3ENTARY NO. 10]. Professor Allan Farnsworth pointed out
this core problem in his brief review of the duty of good faith shortly after promul-
gation of the UCC. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commer-
cial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 666,
678 (1963) ("mf an objective standard is to be read into the general obligation of
good faith performance, the limits on variation by agreement of conditions implied
under that obligation are far from clear."); see also Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable
from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503,
513 (1991) ("The relationship between good faith and the concept of agreement is
both a central and obscure aspect of Code jurisprudence.").
16. The term "new textualism" derives from William Eskridge's examination of a
parallel development in the interpretation of statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1990).
17. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990).
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The duty of good faith performance springs from the simple idea
that certain expectations of fair and reasonable conduct are so
fundamental that the parties rarely mention them in negotia-
tion, and almost never distill them into express terms.18 The
Article argues that the new textualism in contract goes astray in
failing to recognize that this animating tenet of good faith ap-
plies even-indeed, in particular-to a discretionary power oth-
erwise left unrestricted on the face of contractual text. In this
context as well, the duty of good faith and fair dealing fulfills its
essential function by protecting the justified expectations the
parties have not reduced to express contractual language.
The argument on this score proceeds in three principal parts.
Part I explores briefly the course of contract interpretation from
the rigid formalism of classical contract theory through the mod-
ern contextualist approach. The goal of this exercise is to set the
jurisprudential context for the analysis of the new textualism
that follows. To complete this necessary context, Part I con-
cludes with a review of the emergence of the modern duty of
good faith as well as with an examination of the most influential
scholarly theories on its proper conceptualization.
Part II turns to a detailed examination of the new textualism
in action. This recent trend in interpretation renders irrele-
vant-or simply disregards-much of the received wisdom on the
force of good faith in contractual relations. Although (in princi-
ple) the new textualist approach acknowledges a role for the
parties' expectations in good faith analysis, the sum of that
approach is that the only relevant expectations are those an-
chored in the express terms of the parties' writing. This view is
thus little more than a modern resuscitation of what was
thought to be an aging and seriously ailing "plain meaning" rule
in contract interpretation. 9 The distilled consequence is that, in
the face of an express contractual power, notions of "good faith"
and "fair dealing" simply have no role to play at all.
The full impact of this approach comes into sharper focus
when one views the substantial practical consequences that flow
from its application. If every contractual power is presumptively
18. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the normative force of
the "plain meaning rule" in classical contract law).
1228
1999] TEXTUALISM, PARTY AUTONOMY, AND GOOD FAITH 1229
absolute, the duty of good faith provides no limitation on any
decision, for example, to exercise a discretionary right to termi-
nate a contract, to set banking fees, to preclude an assignment
or relocation of a dealership, to cease operations under a lease,
or even to accelerate another party's performance obligations. In
this way, the new restrictive view dispenses with good faith
without a review of the parties' actual expectations or of the con-
text in which the discretionary power arose in the first place.
Part III is the heart of this Article, for it examines the essen-
tial flaws of this new textualist approach to the duty of good
faith. It first explores the centrality of the parties' justified ex-
pectations in the flexible interpretive philosophy embraced in
the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The expec-
tations protected by the duty of good faith amount to more than
the "meaning" of a writing pressed from the surface of its words.
In this sense, the duty of good faith thus operates as the ulti-
mate repudiation of the textualist view that contractual "inter-
pretation" involves merely uncovering the "answer" put "in" a
writing by the parties.
Part III then exposes the poverty of the two fundamental
premises of the new textualism. First, it challenges the factual
assumption that, in absence of an express limitation, every
grant of a discretionary right reflects an agreement of the par-
ties that it is to be absolute. The analysis next turns to the new
textualism's subtle but powerful normative foundation. Properly
appreciated, the doctrine of good faith reverses the classical
presumptions about the burden of expression in the case of dis-
cretionary contractual powers. It does so, contrary to the norma-
tive premise of textualism, by freeing the other party of any
requirement to "protect itself' through negotiation of a corre-
sponding express limitation on such discretion.
The Article concludes with a positive examination of the pow-
er of party autonomy to influence the content of the duty of good
faith. There is persuasive force in the argument that informed
transactors should be able to confer on one, or both, of them a
specific discretionary right whose exercise is insulated from
external standards of fair and reasonable conduct. As the final
section of Part III argues, however, a heightened burden of ex-
pression should attend any attempt to achieve that end. This
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1223
"burden of bargaining" will include both a requirement of explic-
itness and a duty to draw attention to any attempt to contract at
variance from the strictures imposed by the duty of good faith
performance.
The duty of good faith reflects important institutional values
in the law of contracts. At its most elemental, it proceeds from
the premise that the law ought to protect the fundamental ex-
pectations of good faith and reasonable conduct in the perfor-
mance of contractual relations without requiring a corresponding
express agreement of the parties.2 ° In recent years, however, the
rising tide of textualism has threatened to submerge this essen-
tial duty of good faith altogether. 1 Under this view, we are left
with a mere snapshot of the surface of contractual relationships,
unable to examine the complexity of life below. The sum of the
argument advanced here is that this new restrictive trend in
interpretation is founded on fundamentally flawed premises
about the proper function of good faith and fair dealing in the
law of contracts.
I. SETTING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT: CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION AND THE MODERN DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
In one form or another, an obligation of good faith perfor-
mance has existed from the earliest formulations of the law
governing private obligational relationships.22 In this country,
the doctrine began to find tentative recognition as early as the
middle of the nineteenth century.' The appearance of such a
20. See infra notes 200-43, 264-81 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., James A.
Webster, Comment, A Pound of Flesh: The Oregon Supreme Court Virtually Elimi-
nates the Duty to Perform and Enforce Contracts in Good Faith, 75 OR. L. REV. 493,
536-37 & n.182 (1996).
21. See infra notes 139-69 and accompanying text.
22. A duty of good faith in the performance of contractual obligations found recog-
nition even in the classical Roman law on private obligational relationships. See
Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 669-70 (discussing the history of good faith in Roman
law); Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1651-54 (1997) (same); see
also 2 PATRICK MAC CHOMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CIVIL
LAW § 1526, at 452-53 (London, V. & R. Stevens & Sons 1851) (analyzing the essen-
tial features of the bonae fidei contract under Roman law).
23. For examples of early judicial recognition of a duty of good faith in contract,
see Railroad Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392, 413 (1868); Murray v. Lardner,
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notion of "good faith" inevitably required, however, a reconcilia-
tion with the prevailing interpretations of the force of party
autonomy in contractual relations.' It should not surprise, then,
that throughout its history the doctrine of good faith perfor-
mance has been swept along by the same jurisprudential cur-
rents that have guided contract interpretation in general.
Conventional wisdom holds that contract law has evolved from
a "primitive stage of formalism" to a more advanced state that is
able to accommodate the full complexity of contractual relation-
ships. 5 This triumph of realism, the received wisdom runs, has
achieved its full manifestation in the broad acceptance of the
modern duty of good faith performance.26 We shall see in Part II
below, however, that the new textualist approach to the duty of
good faith has established its foundation on the very pillars of
the interpretive formalism of classical contract law.
A. From Formalism to Contextualism: A Short Walk with
Contract Interpretation
1. The Formalist Fixation on Text
The classical (late nineteenth and early twentieth century)
approach to interpretation fastened on contractual text as the
sole repository of interpretive evidence. Consonant with that age
of conceptualism and an elevated assessment of the value of
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 110, 121 (1864); Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 343, 368-
69 (1857); Bush v. Marshall, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 284, 291 (1848); Marsh v. Masterson,
5 N.E. 59, 63 (N.Y. 1886).
24. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 48-49 (1986) (discussing classical
emphasis on private autonomy).
25. See infra notes 46-65 and accompanying text. The phrase "primitive stage of
formalism" emanates from Judge Benjamin Cardozo's classic exposition of the foun-
dations for the modem doctrine of good faith in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (suggesting that "Ithe law has outgrown its primitive
stage of formalism"). For an analysis of the impact of this case on the development
of the doctrine of good faith performance, see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying
text.
26. See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
27. See Mooney, supra note 7, at 1147 (arguing that "classical interpretation deci-
sions seemed often to reflect greater attention to conceptualist abstractions than to
the merits of actual disputes"); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN
AMERICA 20-22 (1965) (discussing the significance of abstractions for classical contract
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certainty and predictability,28 that interpretive philosophy took
on practical manifestation in a variety of seemingly determinate
"rules." The most significant of these were the "plain meaning"
and "parol evidence" rules. These familiar dictates operated in
tandem to define the meaning and the scope of the parties'
agreement without resort to extrinsic evidence to aid the inter-
pretive inquiry.9
The plain meaning rule, as its label suggests, posited that if a
writing appeared unambiguous on its face, the role of an inter-
preter was simply to apply that text as written."0 Indeed, be-
cause it began with the premise that an "unambiguous" provi-
sion was conclusive evidence of actual intent, classical purists
contended that the plain meaning rule relieved the court from
the issue of "interpretation" altogether.3" Classical contract law
law); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (discuss-
ing the "mechanical" jurisprudence around the turn of the century).
28. See, e.g., Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. City of Muncie, 66 N.E. 436, 442 (Ind.
1903) (concluding that when the parties have included a clause in a contract "it
ought to be the endeavor of the court, so far as possible, to give to that [clause] the
element of certainty, and not to import elements of uncertainty into it that the par-
ties did not see fit to mention"); Petrie v. Sherman County Community High Sch., 7
P.2d 104, 106 (Kan. 1932) (asserting that in the law of contracts "[t]he purpose of a
writing is certainty").
29. For a review of the history of these rules of classical contract law, see E.
Allan Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 862-
68 (1968) (discussing the historical development of contract law) [hereinafter
Farnsworth, Omission]; E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76
YALE L.J. 939, 942-65 (1967) (analyzing the classical and modern approaches to the
plain meaning and parol evidence rules) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Meaning]; Helen
Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of Silence,
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 39-64 (1985) (discussing the history of the parol evidence
rule).
30. This classical approach is often associated with the views of Professor Samuel
Williston. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcTS § 95, at 349-
50 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) ("The court will give [written contract] lan-
guage its natural and appropriate meaning; and, if the words are unambiguous, will
not even admit evidence of what the parties may have thought the meaning to be.");
see also 4 id § 610A, at 514 (stating that the express terms of a writing are "the
best and most important evidence of intention").
31. See, e.g., Buffalo Pressed Steel Co. v. Kirwan, 113 A. 628, 630 (Md. 1921)
("[W]here the language of the contract is clear, free from ambiguity or doubt and
complete, there is no need for construction, and it will not be resorted to."); Meyer
Milling Co. v. Baker, 10 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928) ("Of course, if the
language of the contract is clear, and all its terms explicitly stated, then there is no
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then bolstered the force of this rule through a battery of "canons
of construction,"32 which permitted the court to give effect to
written terms without resort to extrinsic evidence, even in the
case of an apparent textual ambiguity.
3 3
The "parol evidence rule" closed the formalist circle.34 If the
disputed writing also appeared to be a complete and final ex-
pression of the parties' intent, this rule barred introduction of
any extrinsic evidence that would contradict or even supplement
the written terms."5 In its classical version, the parol evidence
rule also traveled with a powerful escort, the "four corners"
room for construction, and all the court can do is to declare its effect, and enforce it
as written.").
32. The canons or "maxims" of construction operated as another formalist surro-
gate for the actual intent of the parties. Prominent examples included rules holding
that the expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other possibilities within
the same subject (the familiar expressio unius est exclusio alterius) and that specific
terms should prevail over general ones. See generally WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs §§ 249-250 (St. Paul, West 1894) (discussing the vari-
ous "maxims" of construction); 2 WILLIAM F. ELLIOTr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRAcTS §§ 1505-1536 (1913) (same).
33. Not surprisingly, this approach also tracked the rise of an early rigid "objec-
tive" theory in the recognition of contractual obligations. Judge Learned Hand deliv-
ered perhaps the most famous exposition of this objective theory. See Hotchkiss v.
National City Bank, 200 F. 287, .P93 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speak-
ing, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract
is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties,
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent."); see also
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 242 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belnap
Press 1963) (1881) ("The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties'
minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
conduct."). The rise of this objective theory of contract is commonly traced to Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell's initial distillation of contract law in the late 1800s. See
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4, 11 (1983); Eric M.
Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in
Contract Formation, 39 U. PITt. L. REV. 381, 385 (1978) (discussing Langdel's early
theories in the context of an analysis of the duty of good faith).
34. Strictly speaking, the plain meaning and parol evidence rules fulfill different,
though complementary, functions. The former limits the "evidence" available to inter-
pret express terms in contracts; the latter limits the effect of express or implied
agreements not set forth in a writing.
35. For a comprehensive analysis of the various manifestations of the parol evi-
dence rule from classical through modern contract law, see Hadjiyannakis, supra
note 29, at 39-68; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and
Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1342, 1346-50 (1975) (discussing the origins of the parol evidence rule).
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rule, 6 which required the court to resolve the very issue of inte-
gration-whether the writing in fact reflected the full and final
agreement of the parties-on the face of the document alone. 7
At the foundation of this fixation on written text lies a faith in
both the power of individual autonomy and the certainty of lan-
guage. In conformance with the liberal notions of the time, the
law presumed that transactors were "omniscient,"38 and thus
able to identify and resolve all issues of relevance to their con-
tractual relationship. For its part, the confidence in the determi-
nacy of language led to the conviction that the parties had at
their disposal the fine tools necessary to craft their agreement
with precision. 9
In this light, the normative consequences for contract law be-
came clear: Because the process of contracting permitted the
distillation of a complete and unambiguous agreement, "inter-
pretation" involved merely a "mechanical" process of deducing
the answers already contained in the written text (and, impor-
tantly, without the exercise of judicial discretion).4" From this
foundation, classical contract law also was able to proceed di-
rectly to the conclusion that every contractual right or obligation
was an absolute one,4 ' unless the affected party bargained for an
36. See Hadjiyannakis, supra note 29, at 43-45.
37. See id.; see also George I. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Con-
tracts-Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo.
L. REV. 651, 656-58 (1979) (analyzing classical views on the "four corners" rule). The
first Restatement of Contracts, under the strong influence of Samuel Williston, intro-
duced a limited exception to the "four corners rule" for extrinsic agreements that
similarly situated parties "naturally" would not have included within the writing. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240(1)(b) (1932); 4 WILLISTON, supra note 30, § 638, at
1039-42. For a more detailed analysis of the approach of the first Restatement to
this issue, see Hadjiyannakis, supra note 29, at 45-48.
38. See COLLINS, supra note 24, at 93 (discussing the "presumption of omniscience"
of the classical rules of contract).
39. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 32, §§ 1505-1536 (discussing rules of law based
on the assumption that parties could aptly express their intentions).
40. See Pound, supra note 27, at 606; see also Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit
of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 198-99 (1982) (discussing the rigid "plain meaning"
and "four corners" rules as reflective of the "old spirit of contract").
41. This approach had its most potent impact on claims that the performance of a
contract had become "impossible." See, e.g., Hagar v. Elmslie, 107 F. 511, 514 (3d
Cir. 1901) ("The one who makes ... an absolute and unqualified stipulation must
stand the consequences of his voluntary act, and he will be held by the law of the
1234
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express limitation or qualification.' 2 All that remained for the
office of the law was to provide determinate rules that would
preclude attempts to undermine the force of such "unambiguous"
contractual text through resort to extrinsic evidence. 4s
This rigidity in interpretive inquiries had significant conse-
quences for the nascent doctrine of contractual good faith. The
fixation on "plain meaning" and the primacy of the "four cor-
ners" of a writing, fortified by the faith in the capacity of
transactors to express their agreement in unambiguous lan-
guage, left little room for such a flexible notion as an "implied"
duty of good faith performance. 44 Whatever potential existed in
contract to a strict observance of its terms, even if it becomes impossible of perfor-
mance ... ."); Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448, 451 (1873-74) (stating that even
when performance has become impossible, "the hardship is attributable, not to the
law, but to the contractor himself, who has improvidently assumed an absolute,
when he might have undertaken only a qualified, liability"); see also Farnsworth,
Omission, supra note 29, at 862-64 (discussing this premise of classical contract law).
For an examination of the evolution of the doctrine of impossibility in this respect,
see Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impractica-
bility, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 472-75 (1985).
42. This point, in particular, returns to prominence in the rise of the new
textualist approach to the duty of good faith performance. See infra notes 173-74
and accompanying text. Alternatively, if a party retained unfettered discretion on an
essential element of the contract, classical contract law held that her promise was
"illusory" and thus that the "contract" failed for lack of "mutuality of obligation." Cf.,
e.g., Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co., 179 N.W. 417, 419-20
(Iowa 1920) (holding that a promise to purchase as much coal as a party would
"want to" was unenforceable due to lack of mutuality); Rudd v. Rudd, 2 S.W.2d 585,
587 (Mo. 1927) ("A contract which may be terminated at will by one of the parties
without liability for damages is, for lack of mutuality, not binding.").
43. See Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device
for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 365-68 (1932) (analyzing the role of the
parol evidence rule in preventing manipulation of the jury). For an example of such
sentiments in the case law, see E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522
P.2d 144, 145-46 (Utah 1974) (arguing that a failure to apply the parol evidence
rule would "leave a party to a solemn agreement at the mercy of the uncertainties
of oral testimony given by one who in the subsequent light of events discovers that
he made a bad bargain").
44. The little that remained for good faith was a secondary role as part of the
doctrine of good faith purchase and a much diluted notion of subjective honesty in
fact. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 670-71. As Professor Farnsworth notes, prior
to the impact from the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, only California
and New York appeared to infuse the duty of good faith with a limited objective
component. See id. at 671. See, e.g., Ratzlaff v. Trainor-Desmond Co., 183 P. 269,
271 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Simon v. Etgen, 107 N.E. 1066, 1067 (N.Y. 1915);
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the doctrine from its early recognition45 thus evaporated with
the rise of formalism and the concurrent elevation of the norma-
tive force of certainty and predictability in contractual relations.
2. The Modern Contextual Approach
The formalist foundations of classical contract law were sub-
ject to a withering attack by the forces of realism in the early
part of this century. Applying lessons from other areas of the
law,46 Karl Llewellyn and Arthur Corbin, in particular, chal-
lenged the idea that language (in whatever form) had a single,
determinate meaning, and, derivatively, that the parties were
always able (or even desired) to reduce every detail of their
agreement to express "contractual" text.47 At its core, therefore,
New York Cent. Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 66 N.E. 967, 968
(N.Y. 1903).
45. For examples of early judicial recognition of a duty of good faith in contract,
see supra note 23.
46. Inspired by similar movements in Europe, the early part of this century also
witnessed an assault by the powers of realism on formalism in statutory interpreta-
tion. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); see also
Pound, supra note 27, at 606-10 (discussing the problems with "mechanical formal-
ism" in interpretation). For a general commentary on the influence of Karl
Llewellyn's realism, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(1973); Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay
on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213 (1966).
47. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 161-70 (1965) (observing that written words are inher-
ently ambiguous); K. N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract,
47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938); K. N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Be-
yond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (1938); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
57-66 (1974) (examining the decline of formalism in contract). The insights of
Llewellyn and Corbin (among others) are now well-accepted truths in the law of
contracts. Oliver Wendell Holmes himself long ago observed that "[a] word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918); see also Farnsworth, Meaning,
supra note 29, at 953 (noting the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness and
observing in particular that "[c]ontract language abounds in perturbing examples of
vagueness"); Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753,
765 (1981) (book review) ("Simply as a matter of language, parties cannot fully com-
municate to each other; nor can their words completely capture the future. The lan-
guage they use is as much social as individual, its meaning colored by context and,
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realism attacked the classical premise that express terms always
represent the best evidence of the parties' agreement, at least
without an examination of the context in which the agreement
came into being in the first place.48
Much of the false edifice of classical formalism, already under
substantial pressure in some common law courts, finally crum-
bled with the adoption of the UCC.49 Under the principal direc-
tion of Karl Llewellyn, the Code rejected the classical fixation on
contract text as the definitive evidence of the parties' agree-
ment.5" In its place now stands a flexible search for the actual
agreement of the parties as influenced by the commercial con-
text of its creation. The Code thus defines the core concept of
"agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact," as found not
only in the language they used to describe it but also "by impli-
cation from other circumstances."51 To complete the contextual
picture, the Code expressly recognizes that the content of the
parties' "bargain in fact" necessarily will include trade usages in
the relevant branch of commerce52 as well as the parties' prior
at the time of enforcement, by judicial hindsight and interpretation."); Murray, supra
note 35, at 1344 (describing the notion "that the language has only one true and
plain meaning" as an "archaic absurdity").
48. For a detailed review of the views of Karl Llewellyn on this score, see Dennis
M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of
Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REV. 169, 180-
84 (1989).
49. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 261, 273-74 (1985) (discussing the increasing pressure on the premises of classi-
cal contract law early in this century and concluding that "[t]he dam.., finally
burst with the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code").
50. See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 737 (1931) (arguing that the written contract is merely "a rough indication
around which [real working] relations vary"). For a detailed examination of the
Code's departure from the formalist interpretive theories of Samuel Williston, see
DENNis M. PATIlSON, GOOD FAiTH AND LENDER LIABM=: TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 14-
19 (1990).
51. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995) ("Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances . . ").
52. See id. § 1-205(2) ("A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.").
For a comprehensive analysis of the role of usages of trade under the Code, see
Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, 'Express
1238 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1223
course of dealing" and subsequent course of performance under
their agreement.
54
This flexible, contextual understanding of the parties' "agree-
ment" thus reflects a repudiation of the rigidity of the classical
approach to interpretive inquiries.55 Indeed, the Code states that
it directly "rejects" the notion that an interpreter can divine the
meaning of a writing without consideration of the circumstances
surrounding its making.56 Moreover, the Code requires consider-
ation of a relevant usage of trade and its conceptual cousins
(course of dealing and performance) even if the parties' writing
appears on its face to be a full and final expression of their
agreement.57 Consideration of such circumstances is necessary,
Terms," and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
N.C. L. REV. 777 (1986). For particularly expansive applications of the force of usag-
es of trade under the Code, see, for example, Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell
Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an express price term was
overcome by a usage of trade requiring a supplier to "price protect" a contractor);
Modine Mfg. Co. v. North E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-38 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (permitting introduction of trade usage evidence to show that the term
"capacities shall not be less than indicated" should be interpreted to permit "reason-
able variations" in capacity).
53. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) ("A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct.").
54. See id. § 2-208(1). Section 2-208 states:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance ac-
cepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement.
Id. Although this particular definition of "course of performance" is found only in
Article 2, which governs sales transactions, its inclusion in section 1-201(3) makes
clear that the general concept is part of the definition of all "agreements" governed
by the Code.
55. The concept of a "contract" is relegated almost to an afterthought in this flexi-
ble interpretive scheme. See id. § 1-201(11) (defining a "contract" merely as "the
total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement").
56. This point is made forcefully in the comments to section 1-205. See id. § 1-205
cmt. 1 ("The meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined by the
language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances.").
57. See id. § 2-202(a). Although this particular provision is found in Article 2 gov-
erning sales transactions, the Code elsewhere makes clear that such contextual evi-
dence may "supplement or qualify" the express terms of a writing. See id. §§ 1-
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the Code emphasizes, in order for an interpreter to divine the
"true understanding" of the parties.58
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, now followed in princi-
ple by a number of common-law courts,5 9 proceeds on the same
fundamental course. Like the Code, it mandates that "[w]ords
and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circum-
stances"6" and rejects any requirement of "ambiguity" in express
terms before the surrounding circumstances become relevant.61
Indeed, even more forcefully than the Code, the Second Restate-
ment makes clear that extrinsic evidence of the parties' actual
understanding on the meaning of an express term is always
205(3) (regarding usage of trade and course of dealing), 2-208(1) (regarding course of
performance); see also id. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (stating that evidence derived from com-
mercial context "may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final
writing" (emphasis added)). This conclusion applies with particular force for a course
of performance. The Code expressly provides that this form of "agreement" between
the parties may be "relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsis-
tent with such course of performance." Id. § 2-208(3) (referencing section 2-209).
58. See id. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (noting that section 2-202 makes evidence of usage of
trade, etc. admissible "in order that the true understanding of the parties . . .may
be reached"); see also id. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (stating that the Code "definitively re-
jects ... (c) The requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of the
type of evidence specified in paragraph (a) [usages of trade, etc.] is an original de-
termination by the court that the language used is ambiguous").
59. Perhaps the most famous rejection of the "four corners" and "plain meaning"
rules of classical contract law is found in the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal.
1968). For other common law opinions in the same vein, see, for example, Keating v.
Stadium Management Corp., 508 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); C.R. Anthony
Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1991); Abercrombie v. Hayden
Corp., 883 P.2d 845 (Or. 1994); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1990).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACS § 202(1) (1981); see also Robert B.
Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 13 (1981) (providing observations by the Reporter of the Second
Restatement on its interpretive scheme); Speidel, supra note 40, at 199-200 (discuss-
ing the importance of contextual factors in the Second Restatement's flexible interpre-
tive approach).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. a (stating that the rules of
interpretation 'do not depend upon any determination that there is an ambiguity,
but are used in determining what meanings are reasonably possible as well as in
choosing among possible meanings"); id. § 212 cmt. b (asserting that "meaning can
almost never be plain except in context" and concluding that extrinsic evidence is
always admissible to show the meaning of a writing); id. § 214 cmt. b ('Even
though words seem on their face to have only a single possible meaning, other
meanings often appear when circumstances are disclosed.").
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admissible, even in the face of a fully integrated agreement.6 2
Similarly, the Second Restatement requires examination of all
relevant evidence on the issues of integration and the consis-
tency of extrinsic evidence with the written text, even if the
writing appears complete on its face."
The express terms of a contract of course retain significant
interpretive force under both the Code and the Second Restate-
ment. Both in fact will afford primacy to express terms if an
interpretation consistent with contextual evidence would be
unreasonable under the circumstances."4 This apparent hierar-
chy operates, however, subject to a more powerful, primary di-
rective in interpretive inquiries. This directive requires that an
interpreter first exhaust all reasonable means of reconciling the
various sources of interpretive evidence before making a reflex-
ive retreat to the apparent meaning of the express terms.65
62. See id. § 214(c) (stipulating that extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish
"the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated").
63. See id. § 209 cmt. c ("Whether a writing has been adopted as an integrated
agreement is a question of fact to be determined in accordance with all relevant
evidence."); id. § 216 cmt. b ("The determination whether an alleged additional term
is consistent or inconsistent with the integrated agreement requires interpretation of
the writing in the light of all the circumstances, including the evidence of the addi-
tional term."). Under the influence of Arthur Corbin, the Second Restatements ver-
sion of the parol evidence rule thus disavowed many of the premises of its classical
predecessor. For an examination of the influence of Professor Corbin on the Second
Restatement's parol evidence rule, see Hadjiyannakis, supra note 29, at 51-55. Even
in the case of a fully integrated writing, the Second Restatement, like the Code be-
fore it, admits evidence of usage of trade as well as of prior and subsequent conduct
to explain, supplement, or even qualify the writing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 222(3) (stating that usage of trade "gives meaning to or supplements or
qualifies" the parties' agreement); id. § 223(2) (applying the same analysis to course
of dealing); id. § 202(4) (stating that course of performance is given "great weight"
in interpretation).
64. See U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (providing that express terms control usage of trade and
course of dealing if a consistent construction is "unreasonable"); see also id. § 2-
208(2) (defining the same result but also including a course of performance); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (stating that express terms are given
"greater weight" than usage of trade and courses of dealing and performance).
65. See U.C.C. § 1-205(4) ("he express terms of an agreement and an applicable
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consis-
tent with each other . . . ."); see also id. § 2-208(2) (defining the same result but
including a course of performance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (stat-
ing the same result for all three sources).
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This is, of course, but a brief summary of conventional con-
tract interpretation. It nonetheless suffices for present purposes,
for the important message at this stage in our analysis is one of
principle: Even at the basic level of the interpretation of the
obligations constructed through a formal agreement of the par-
ties, both the UCC and the modern approach reflected in the
Second Restatement have swept away the rigid textualist pre-
sumption that the parties' writing represents the definitive
source of interpretive evidence. It is in this environment that we
turn to the (re)emergence of perhaps the most controversial
doctrine in modern contract law, the duty of good faith that is
imposed on the parties in the performance of contractual rela-
tionships.
B. The Emergence and Significance of the Duty of Good Faith
We have seen above that the rigidity of classical formalism in
large measure relegated the duty of good faith performance to a
place of insignificance in contract doctrine.66 At this early stage
in its development, the principal function of such a notion was
merely a negative one: "Good faith" operated to preclude a party
from taking affirmative action to "prevent or hinder" the satis-
faction of a contractual condition or actual performance by the
other party.6
7
Early indications of a more promising future came in an ex-
panded understanding of the traditional "implied promise" theo-
ry. Thus, as Benjamin Cardozo famously observed in Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon," an express promise may be lacking
"and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,'
66. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
67. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 295 (1932) (precluding "prevent[ion] or
hind[rance]" of the satisfaction of a condition to performance). For an example from
this early stage in the good faith doctrine, see Cains v. Bassick, 175 N.Y.S. 670, 673
(App. Div. 1919) ("To hold that one may employ another . .. to do a specific thing,
and yet may with impunity deliberately prevent the other from doing that thing,
is ... plainly violative of good faith."); see also 1 NEW YORK REVISION COMM'N, RE-
PORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORi COMMERCIAL CODE 310, 312-14 (1955) (containing an
examination by Professor Edwin Patterson of New York case law on this subject in
connection with the adoption of the UCC in New York).
68. 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
1242 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1223
imperfectly expressed." 9 Such a promise was implied in the
exclusive dealing arrangement at issue in that case, Judge
Cardozo reasoned, because the law should not "suppose that one
party was to be placed at the mercy of the other.""°
The function of this "implied promise" thus was a positive one:
It provided the external standard necessary to rescue a relation-
ship from the "lack of mutuality" that was fatal to enforceable
obligations under the traditional common law.71 At the same
time, a small number of other courts, most notably in New York,
began to recognize that the proper justification for such an "im-
plied promise" was to be found in a broader duty of good faith
performance.72 Nonetheless, through the early part of this centu-
ry, the significance of contractual good faith lay more in its
promise than in its practical significance.7 3
The adoption of the UCC breathed new life into the doctrine
of good faith.74 As is now well known, section 1-203 of the UCC
69. Id. at 214 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (App. Div.
1909), affd, 91 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1910)); see also Robert A. Hillman, 'Instinct with an
Obligation" and the "Normative Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power," 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 775
(1995) (providing an illuminating examination of the "rhetorical power" of this obser-
vation as applied by Judge Cardozo).
70. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
71. See STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH 30-31
(1995); Hillman, supra note 69, at 779-94.
72. The most famous exposition of this early notion of good faith came in Kirke
La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933), in which the New
York Court of Appeals stated:
In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall
do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right
of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that
in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Id. at 167. For a more detailed examination of this early history of the duty of good
faith, see BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 21-34.
73. The doctrine of good faith similarly operated as an implied limitation on ex-
press "satisfaction" clauses in contracts. For an early case to this effect, see Clausen
v. Vonnoh, 105 N.Y.S. 102 (App. Term. 1907) (regarding satisfaction with a portrait).
For a more recent example, see Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921,
925 (Ct. App. 1997) (reversing summary judgment against a claim by Sondra Locke
that a movie studio breached the duty of good faith by rejecting her movie propos-
als).
74. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 671 ("[B]y the time of the promulgation of
the Uniform Commercial Code, good faith performance had, in spite of its ancient
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establishes that "[e]very contract or duty within [the Code] im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment."75 This general obligation is then supplemented by nearly
sixty express references to "good faith" in the more specific pro-
visions of the Code.76 As the comment to section 1-203 makes
clear, the duty of good faith is not limited to these particular
applications; rather, it represents a comprehensive principle that
applies to all obligations within the scope of the Code.77
This aspect of the UCC, perhaps more than any other, pro-
foundly influenced the course of contract law in the United
States. Following the lead of the UCC, the Second Restatement
embraced the fundamental precept that "[e]very contract impos-
es upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."78 The promulgation of the
Second Restatement in turn gave impetus to a nascent trend in
the common law of the states. Indeed, by the mid-1980s effec-
tively all of the states had recognized a broadly applicable duty
of good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts.79
lineage, become a poor and neglected relation of good faith purchase. The Code re-
vive[d] it. . . ").
75. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995). As this provision makes clear, the duty of good faith
also imposes a duty of good faith in the "enforcement" of a contract. Although diffi-
cult definitional issues may arise, the primary focus in this aspect of good faith is
the enforcement of rights after breach, including in particular the assertion of claims
for breach and the mitigation of damages. For a comprehensive analysis of good
faith in enforcement, see Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Con-
tracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299 (1988) (arguing that an enforcing party acts in good
faith if, under the circumstances existing at the time of enforcement, invocation of
an enforcement term would advance primarily the purposes for which it was includ-
ed in the agreement without imposing unnecessary costs on the other party).
76. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203 cmt. (listing sections 1-208, 2-508, 2-603, 2-614, and
2-615 as "[p]articular applications of [the] general principle" of good faith), 2A-109(1),
2A-405(a), 3-416(b), 3-417(a), 4-103(a), 4A-202(b), 5-109(a)(1), 7-203, 7-206(2), 9-206(1),
9-208(2).
77. See id. § 1-203 cmt. (stating that the concept of good faith "applies general-
ly . . . to the performance or enforcement of every contract or duty within this Act,"
and that "[tihis section sets forth a basic principle running throughout this Act").
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
79. See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating
When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Frame-
work for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585 n.1 (1996) (listing cita-
tions of state courts that have expressly recognized a broadly-applicable duty of good
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This elevation of the doctrine of good faith to a pervasive
contractual duty also brought, however, a broader-and more
controversial-potential to influence the content of the parties'
obligations in the first instance.8 0 In its less contentious form,
this modern version has continued its traditional function of
forbidding affirmative acts that would prevent or hinder perfor-
mance by another party, which may also include an obligation of
cooperation in the satisfaction of conditions within a party's
control.8 Moreover, and more commonly, recent courts have
pressed the doctrine into service as a means to fill gaps in in-
complete contracts.82
faith performance). For an earlier list to the same effect, see Steven J. Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 369, 404 (1980). There are a few notable exceptions. Texas has rejected a
broad common-law duty of good faith in absence of a "special relationship" between
the parties. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 356 (Tex. 1995);
Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. 1994). Moreover, a number of
states have refused to recognize such a duty in at-will employment relationships. For
a comprehensive analysis of this latter issue, see Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdic-
tions in Search of a Standard The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the
Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1233 (1992) (studying state approaches to the
role of good faith in employment relationships).
80. It is worth emphasizing here that the duty of good faith also can have broad-
ranging implications in the enforcement of contracts. See supra note 75 and accompa-
nying text.
81. See Tagare v. Nynex Network Sys. Co. 994 F. Supp. 149, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that the duty of good faith and fair dealing "includes 'an implied undertak-
ing on the part of each party that he will not intentionally and purposely do any-
thing to prevent the other party from carrying out the agreement on his part"
(quoting Carrel Corp. v. Diversified Management Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 230 (2d
Cir. 1991))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (defining bad faith to
include "interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance");
see also infra note 349 (citing recent applications of this principle).
82. See, e.g., Taylor Equip., Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir.
1996) (describing good faith as a "method to fill gaps" in a contract (quoting Conti-
nental Bank, NA. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1992))), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1553 (1997); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Marino, 63 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1994)
(same); see also Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 672 (noting over 25 years ago that
"the chief utility of the concept of good faith performance has always been as a
rationale in a process . . of implying contract terms"). The new textualists in con-
tract acknowledge only this role for the duty of good faith, and even then only in a
substantially restricted form. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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The final function of the modern doctrine of good faith is the
most controversial. The debate at this level revolves around the
extent to which good faith can limit, modify, or otherwise give
content to the express terms of a contract.8 3 In a variety of sepa-
rate provisions, the Code, for example, imposes a good faith
limitation on the exercise of specific discretionary powers." The
question that remains, however, is whether this role of good
faith performance can apply in a comprehensive manner to place
similar limits on contractual behavior in general.
Contributing to the controversy is ambiguity over the very
power of the parties to influence the force of the duty of good
faith. On the one hand, the Code expressly prohibits contracting
parties from disclaiming the application of good faith in its en-
tirety."5 Although the case law is limited, there is a solid consen-
sus that the same conclusion obtains in the common law as
well. 6 The Code then provides, however, that the parties remain
free to define by agreement the standards by which good faith is
83. See infra notes 103-29 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (1995) (noting that a party's right to specify a price
term is subject to good faith); id. § 2-306(1) (same regarding unspecified quantities
under requirement and output contracts); id. § 2-311(1) (same regarding a party's
specification of other particulars of performance); see also id. § 1-208 (imposing good
faith limitations on discretionary acceleration of performance obligations); id. § 2A-
109 (same in the lease context).
85. See id. § 1-102(3) ("T]he obligation] of good faith . . . prescribed by this Act
may not be disclaimed by agreement. . .).
86. See BA Mortgage & Intl Realty Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
706 F. Supp. 1364, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Morris v. Columbia Nat'l Bank, 79
B.R. 777, 785 (N.D. M11. 1987)); Rhode Island Hasp. Trust v. Trust, No. 700674, 1992
WL 38350 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 1992); Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162,
166 (Mont. 1988); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 797 n.7 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (stating that the obligation of good faith "is imposed by law and cannot
be disclaimed" (quoting Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994))). But cf Cambridgeport Say.
Bank v. Boersner, 597 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Mass. 1992) (concluding without analysis
that an express agreement to waive defenses to a guaranty obligation also amounted
to a waiver of the protection of good faith). Scholarly commentary is in accord with
the proposition that the duty of good faith cannot be waived in its entirety. See
BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 72-74; 3A CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
654A(B) (Supp. 1998); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract With-
in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1981).
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to be measured (as long as such standards are not "manifestly
unreasonable")."7 For its part, the Second Restatement fails to
provide any express guidance on this score."'
The recognition of a broadly applicable, abstract duty of good
faith performance thus leaves the analysis with the more chal-
lenging problem of defining its proper scope and force in practi-
cal application. Intense scholarly effort over the years, as we
shall see in detail immediately below, has yielded substantial
insights into the conceptualization of good faith.89 Considerable
controversy remains, however, and no more so than on the pre-
cise interaction between express contractual text and the force of
good faith performance.
87. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (stating that although the obligation of good faith may
not be disclaimed, "the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligation[] is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable"). With regard to the import of this latter clause, see infra
note 354 and accompanying text. For an examination of pre-Code law in light of the
proposed "nondisclaimability" language of section 1-102(3), see 1 NEW YORK REVISION
COMM'N, supra note 67, at 310, 312-14 (relating comments by Professor Edwin
Patterson). Subsequent law unification efforts have also embraced this scheme of
prohibiting broad disclaimers of the duty of good faith, while permitting the parties
to define the standards by which good faith is to be measured. See Revised Uniform
Partnership Act §§ 103(b)(5), 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 1 (1995); Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act §§ 103(b)(4), 409(d), 6A U.LA 434 (1995).
88. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
89. For analyses of the general conceptualization of the duty of good faith, see
BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71; Andersen, supra note 75; Burton, supra note 79;
Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1533 (1994) [hereinafter Burton, Practice View]; Burton,
supra note 86; Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) [hereinafter, Burton, Reply];
Diamond & Foss, supra note 79; Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1971);
Farnsworth, supra note 15; Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of
Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J. 619; Litvinoff, supra note 22; Timothy J. Muris, Oppor-
tunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981); Patterson,
supra note 15; Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Sum-
mers, supra note 9.
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C. The Competing Conceptualizations of Good Faith
1. The Decreasing Significance of the Subjective-Objective
Debate
Unfortunately, the UCC itself provided much of the initial fuel
for the controversy over the conceptualization of the duty of good
faith. In its general provisions, the Code defines "good faith"
merely as "honesty in fact,"90 a standard historically understood
as a "subjective" one." In language originally limited to "mer-
chants" in sales transactions, however, the Code's Article 2 then
added an overlay of "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing" to this minimalist floor.92 The resultant ambiguity in
interaction led scholars to expend considerable intellectual ener-
gy on divining where the subjective standard should end and the
force of objective reasonableness should begin."
Close examination reveals that this abstract debate is rapidly
becoming more theoretical smoke than practical fire. First, and
most important, the continuing overhaul of the various Articles
of the Code already has substantially diminished the relevance
of the minimalist subjective test. Articles 2A, 3, 4, 4A, and 8
now have expressly joined the objective standard first embraced
90. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (defining good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned").
91. Robert Braucher once famously termed this the "pure heart and the empty
head" test. Braucher, supra note 7, at 812; see also Martin J. Aronstein, Good Faith
Performance of Security Agreements: The Liability of Corporate Managers, 120 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1971) (stating that good faith as defined in section 1-201(19) of the
UCC "[has] been historically construed as applying only to the actor's subjective
state of mind"); Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70. 92 n.64 (1993) (discussing the
history of the Code's restriction of good faith "to the subjective duty of honesty in
fact").
92. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (defining good faith for merchants in sales of goods
transactions as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in the trade").
93. See Burton, supra note 86, at 16-18 (examining the drafting history of, and
the internal inconsistencies in, the Code's original approach to the definition of good
faith); Summers, supra note 89, at 207-16 (discussing in detail the drafting history
of the Code's subjective standard of good faith); see also Farnsworth, supra note 15,
at 673-74 (criticizing the original subjective standard for "enfeebl[ing]" the notion of
good faith and arguing that it should properly include a requirement of commercial
reasonableness).
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in Article 2.94 Even the recently completed work on Article 9 gov-
erning secured transactions adopted, after much contentious
debate, the same approach. 5 Indeed, the drafting work on the
revised "General Provisions" in Article 1 is explicitly proceeding
on the basis of a generally-applicable definition of good faith
that includes "reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing."96
94. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(3) (incorporating by reference the objective standard of
UCC section 2-103(1)(b) with regard to lease transactions); id. § 3-103(a)(4) (defining
good faith with respect to negotiable instruments as "honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"); id. § 4-104(c) (incorporat-
ing by reference the definition of good faith from section 3-103 for the actions of
banks); id. § 4A-105(a)(6) (defining good faith with respect to fund transfers by
banks as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing"); id. § 8-102(a)(10) (defining good faith with respect to investment secu-
rities as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing").
95. See id. § 9-102(43) (Pre-Final Official Draft (as approved) 1998), available in
National Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, Official
Site (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllIulclulc.htm> [hereinafter
NCCUSL Official Site] (defining "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"). The drafting work on Article 2B
governing licenses is proceeding on the same basis. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(22) (August
1 Draft, 1998) (defining "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing"). The one limited exception remains
Article 5 governing letters of credit. In that case, the unique three-party relation-
ship, together with the "ministerial" role played by banks in honoring presentations,
of their very nature require a limited notion of good faith. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(7)
(defining good faith with respect to letters of credit merely as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned").
96. The draft revisions to UCC Article 1 explicitly expand the definition of "good
faith" to include an objective component of reasonable commercial standards. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(22) (September 1997 Draft) (defining the general obligation of "good
faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing") (emphasis added), available at NCCUSL Official Site, supra note 95.
The draft revisions to Article 1 also carry forward the existing provisions on the
duty of good faith and its interaction with party autonomy. See id. § 1-305 ("There
is an obligation to act in good faith in the performance and enforcement of every
contract and duty within the scope of [the Code]."); see also id. § 1-303(b) ("Except
as provided elsewhere in [the Code], the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care prescribed by [the Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement.
The parties, by agreement, may determine the standards by which the performance
of those obligations is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unrea-
sonable.").
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In addition, even in the transitional period, a subjective stan-
dard will involve a consideration of the surrounding circum-
stances to examine the candor of a party claiming "honesty in
fact."9" Thus, the precise content of even this minimalist duty of
"good faith" will be decisively influenced by the facts and cir-
cumstances of the specific case,9" including the expectations that
arise in the commercial and relational context.99
The more recent Second Restatement is sensitive to this intu-
itive reality. The comments to its section on good faith make
clear that the content of the obligation of good faith "varies
somewhat with the context.""' Avoiding the often confusing
objective-subjective distinction altogether, the comments then
conclude that "bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction,
and fair dealing may require more than honesty" in the perfor-
mance of contractual obligations.0 1
97. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 672 ("Under a subjective test of good faith
it is always open to the trier of the facts to evaluate the credibility of a claim of
'honesty in fact,' and in doing so to take account of the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of the claim."). For an application of this conclusion, see J.R. Hale Con-
tracting Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990) (restating the
essence of Professor Farnsworth's observation and concluding that even under a
"subjective" standard of good faith, "the conduct and credibility of the [defendant]
may be tested by objective standards subject to proof and conducive to the applica-
tion of reasonable expectations in commercial affairs").
98. See U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (noting that the doctrine of good faith "directs a court
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are cre-
ated"); PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15 (stating that the "reasonable expec-
tations" approach embraced there "applies with equal force" to both the subjective
and objective tests defined in the Code).
99. There is also a compelling argument that the common law's objective stan-
dards may be imported into the Code's minimalist subjective definition of good faith
by way of its gap-filing regime. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (providing that the "principles of
law and equity" apply "juinless displaced by the particular revisions of [the Code]");
see also Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587 (N.J. 1997) (hold-
ing that, although in general the Code's subjective standard applied, "the obligation
to perform in good faith found in our common law will also influence the result");
ROBERT A. HILmAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUINY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE I 6.03[4] (1985) (arguing that because of the Code's restrictive definition of
good faith "one may assume that the common-law and equitable sources of the good-
faith obligation will be heavily employed through the avenue of Section 1-103");
Summers, supra note 89, at 197 (advancing a similar argument).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
101. Id. cmt. d.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1223
The once-contentious issue of the Code's competing subjective
and objective standards of good faith thus rapidly is losing its
luster.' ° Nonetheless, the general acceptance of a fortified duty
of "good faith and fair dealing" only increases the significance of
the debate over its conceptualization. To set the context for our
subsequent analysis, I turn below to a brief review of the two
principal theories that have defined the contours of this debate.
2. Excluder Analysis and the Second Restatement
In one of the earliest and most influential analyses in the
area, Professor Robert Summers argued that the concept of
"good faith" lacks a single, unifying meaning. 10 3 Relying on the
philosophical insights of J.L. Austin, Professor Summers argued
that a more fruitful means of analysis would be to view "good
faith" as the absence of its opposite, "bad faith."'O° Thus, he
reasoned, good faith as applied by the courts "is best understood
as an 'excluder'... a phrase which has no general meaning or
meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many heteroge-
neous forms of bad faith."0 5
To aid in the practical application of this "excluder analysis,"
Professor Summers suggests what is in effect a common-law
approach. Although suspicious of "reductionist definitions," °6
even of bad faith, he first offered a nonexhaustive list of catego-
ries of conduct that would qualify as "bad faith."07 With this
102. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 74 (concluding that the case law on
the objective-subjective debate "is neither consistent nor enlightening," and arguing
in favor of a general objective approach); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27-3 (3d ed. 1988) (concluding, after reviewing case law
on the ambiguous standard defined in Code section 1-208 for the acceleration of
payment obligations, that "the objective vs. subjective dispute may not be very im-
portant").
103. See Summers, supra note 89, at 199-209, 262.
104. See id. at 201-02 (quoting and discussing J. L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA
70-71 (G. J. Warnock ed., 1962)). For a critical view on the use of Austin's excluder
analysis in the context of good faith, see Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the
Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article 9, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 335, 349-50 (1998).
105. Summers, supra note 89, at 196.
106. Id. at 207.
107. Professor Summers suggests six categories in this regard: evasion of the spirit
of the deal; lack of diligence and slacking off; willful rendering of only substantial
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foundation, the aspiration is that courts will use the descriptive
list, and the precedent developed by analogy, as a means to "the
accumulation of a viable body of case law on good faith."'0 8 A fair
number of courts in fact have expressed support for such a gen-
eral, common-law approach to the duty of good faith.'0 9
This conceptualization of good faith also substantially influ-
enced the subsequent drafting of the Second Restatement. Conso-
nant with "excluder analysis," the Second Restatement does not
attempt a formal, positive definition of "good faith." Rather, the
comments to section 205 of the Second Restatement merely state
that the notion "excludes a variety of types of conduct character-
ized as involving 'bad faith'."" Indeed, those comments ex-
pressly embrace the descriptive categories of "bad faith" first
identified by Professor Summers as analytical guideposts for a
casuistic development of the law by the courts."'
Unfortunately, neither pure "excluder analysis" nor the Sec-
ond Restatement offers guidance on the precise interaction of the
duty of good faith with the force of party autonomy."2 At one
point, the comments to the Second Restatement indicate that the
duty of good faith derives its force from expectations awakened
as the parties' contractual relationship takes shape: "Good faith
performance emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common pur-
performance; abuse of power to specify terms; abuse of power to determine compli-
ance; and interference with or failure to cooperate in performance by the other par-
ty. See id. at 232-43.
108. Id. at 206; see also id. at 264 ( [Olnce we accumulate a body of holdings on
what forms of conduct are in bad faith, we should then have the certainty [one
would] want, at least as to those forms of conduct . . ").
109. See, e.g., Occusafe, Inc. v. EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc., 54 F.3d 618, 624 (10th
Cir. 1995); Fremont v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 988 F. Supp. 870, 877 (E.D.
Pa. 1997); Larson v. Larson, 636 N.E.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994);
Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1994); see also
Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 590 n.16 (listing more cases that have expressed
support for "excluder analysis").
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981); see also id. cmt. d
(asserting that "[a] complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible").
111. See id. cmt. d (listing Professor Summers's six categories of bad faith almost
verbatim as "among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions").
112. Consonant with the notion of "excluder analysis," this ambiguity may be in-
tentional. See Summers, supra note 89, at 215 (criticizing the approach of the Code
to the duty of good faith and asserting that "[i]f an obligation of good faith is to do
its job, it must be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition").
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pose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party." 3 This is a view shared in principle by Professor Sum-
mers.
114
At the same time, however, both the comments to the Restate-
ment and Professor Summers suggest that the duty of good faith
imposes limitations on party autonomy that derive from broader
normative concerns of "decency, fairness or reasonableness."" 5
In the words of Professor Summers, good faith "is of a piece with
explicit requirements of 'contractual morality' such as the un-
conscionability doctrine and various general equitable princi-
ples.""6 Under this view, in short, the doctrine of good faith
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a.
114. See Summers, supra note 89, at 263 ("In most cases the party acting in bad
faith frustrates the justified expectations of another.").
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt. a (stating that good faith
excludes *types of conduct involving bad faith "because they violate community stan-
dards of decency, fairness or reasonableness"); see also Summers, supra note 9, at
826 (agreeing with this rationale for good-faith requirements). For an unusually
frank judicial statement of this view, see Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr.
820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986), stating that "the obligations stemming from the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are imposed by law as normative values of
society."
116. Summers, supra note 9, at 811 (footnotes omitted). In this respect, substantial
similarities exist between excluder analysis and the broader theory of "relational
contracts." The relational contract theory posits that some contracts would be better
understood as wholly cooperative, evolving relationships in which the values of "dis-
creetness" and "presentation" yield to norms, inter alia, of cooperation, mutual ad-
justment of obligations, and equitable harmonization of conflicts. See generally IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE NEW SOcIAL CONTRACT (1980) (developing a broader theory of human
relationships from the notion of a "social contract"); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981) (describing the
basic aspects of relational contracts); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-
Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978) (discussing the conflict in contract law between the
need for stability and the need for flexibility, and the ways contractual relations are
affected by this conflict) [hereinafter Macneil, Adjustment]; Ian R. Macneil, Values in
Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340 (1983) (discussing the values
involved in various types of contracts); Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational
Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.AL L. REV. 789 (1993) (advocating the inclusion of certain
relational norms in the revision of UCC Article 2 in response to the development of
the principles of relational contract theory). The doctrine of good faith performance
would indeed fit comfortably in the definition of such relationships. See Gillian K.
Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42
STAN. L. REv. 927, 984-86 (1990) (arguing with regard to franchise relationships that
"[tihe doctrinal tool necessary to bring the resolution of franchise contract disputes
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performance can operate, at some undefined level, to displace
even an informed, explicit agreement between the parties. 7
In this respect, excluder analysis overstates the proper force
of the doctrine of good faith performance." 8 Nonetheless, at its
core this approach offers an insight that will be of significance in
our subsequent analysis: namely, that the duty of good faith can
derive its content not only from the actual, formal agreements of
the parties, but also from broader community expectations of
fairness and reasonable conduct."' Unfortunately, the potential
of the casuistic development suggested by excluder analysis also
is particularly susceptible to dilution in the changing jurispru-
dential tides of contract interpretation. As we shall see below, it
is precisely the refusal to consider such broader contextual mat-
ters that has permitted the new textualism to avoid an analysis
of the duty of good faith performance altogether.20
into line with the realities of the franchise relation is the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing"); Speidel, supra note 40, at 201-08 (discussing the importance of good
faith under the "new spirit" of contract). Unfortunately, relational contract theory
has found little acceptance in the courts. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at
414 (concluding that "[p]ractically speaking, relational contract law has received little
endorsement from the courts"). The principal reason for this is that the specifics of
each relationship have frustrated attempts to generalize about the proper "signals"
that would indicate that the parties have entered into such a "relational contract."
See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules
for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990) (arguing that the particulars of each
case preclude identification of a broad background norm based on either cooperation
or egoism); Goetz & Scott, supra note 49, at 320 ("Unfortunately, current rules of
interpretation provide few effective mechanisms for distinguishing between apparent
inconsistency and deliberate indeterminacy. For relational contractors, therefore,
interpretive disputes will essentially be a lottery until the state provides the requi-
site instruments for more accurate signaling.").
117. See Summers, supra note 89, at 197-200 (suggesting that the duty of good
faith operates in this sense to promote 'justice, and justice according to law").
118. See Burton, Reply, supra note 89, at 498-99 (criticizing excluder analysis to
the extent that it "implies that courts typically use the doctrine to render agreed
terms unenforceable or to impose obligations that are incompatible with the agree-
ment reached at formation"); see also Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 590-92
(criticizing the approach as requiring resolution of good faith on an "intuitive ad hoc
basis"); Gillette, supra note 89, at 650 (expressing similar criticisms); Patterson,
supra note 104, at 350 (arguing that the flaw in excluder analysis lies in the belief
that it "provides judges with sufficient material from which to fashion analogies
between old and new instances of bad faith").
119. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 144-92 and accompanying text. For a positive analysis of the
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3. The "Foregone Opportunities" Approach
The second major contribution to the conceptualization of the
duty of good faith seeks to focus the analysis on opportunities
foregone in the contracting process. Developed by Professor Ste-
ven Burton, this approach equates "bad faith" with an attempt
by a party to recapture a "cost" of performance (a "foregone op-
portunity") allocated to her upon entering the contract.'2 ' The
essential interpretive issue of whether a party has agreed to
forego an opportunity in this fashion is determined by the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties at the time of formation.
122
Under this view, the duty of good faith performance assumes
its core function when one party retains an ability to control the
content or value of performance after formation. Such a "discre-
tion in performance" arises when the contract reserves to one
party a power to set the terms of performance, such as (among
others) the quantity, price, or time." Thus, Professor Burton
concludes, "[bad faith performance occurs precisely when discre-
tion is used to recapture opportunities foregone upon contract-
ing-when the discretion-exercising party refuses to pay the ex-
pected cost of performance." 24
appropriate burden of expression to displace the limitations imposed by the duty of
good faith performance, see infra notes 285-347 and accompanying text.
121. See Burton, supra note 79, at 387-92; see also BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note
71, at 34-57 (expounding on this approach); Burton, Reply, supra note 89, at 499-507
(defending the foregone opportunities approach in response to criticisms by Professor
Summers).
122. See Burton, supra note 79, at 390-91.
123. See id. at 373; see also BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 45-50 (elaborat-
ing on the notion of "discretion in performance"); Burton, Reply, supra note 89, at
501-03 (discussing the same); infra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the
role of the doctrine of good faith in countering arguments that a party's discretion
on an essential contractual term amounts to an illusory, and thus unenforceable,
promise). For an analysis of the significance of discretionary powers in light of the
rise of the new textualism in contract, see infra notes 244-63 and accompanying
text.
124. Burton, supra note 79, at 373. For the ultimate issue of the breach of the
duty of good faith, Professor Burton originally distilled the foregone opportunities
into two essential questions: first, at formation, what were the reasonably expected
costs of performance (foregone opportunities) to the discretion-exercising party?; and
second, at performance, did the discretion-exercising party use that discretion to
recapture the foregone opportunity? Professor Burton conceives of the first inquiry as
an objective standard and the second as a subjective one. See Burton, Reply, supra
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Important insights emerge at the core of this approach as
well. Casting the issue in terms of economic costs 125 and "fore-
gone opportunities" may add little to the analysis in itself.126
Nonetheless, as discussed in more detail below, the clear trend
note 89, at 506-07.
125. Another possible conceptualization of contractual good faith arises from the
now-familiar efforts to divine the appropriate "default rules" of contract law from
economic considerations. For an introduction into the voluminous literature on this
subject, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, De-
fault Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Jason
Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). Some scholars have argued in this vein that the
only appropriate role for good faith is in prohibiting "opportunistic" behavior that is
made possible by the sequential nature of contract performance. See, e.g., Original
Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273,
280 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (arguing with regard to the duty of good faith that
"[c]ontract law imposes a duty, not to 'be reasonable,' but to avoid taking advantage
of gaps in a contract in order to exploit the vulnerabilities that arise when contrac-
tual performance is sequential rather than simultaneous"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMiic ANALYSIS OF LAW 92-94 (4th ed. 1992); see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Econom-
ics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 140-41 (1989) (noting the importance of
good faith in prohibiting opportunistic attempts to extract favorable contract mod-
ifications); Muris, supra note 89, at 552-72 (constructing a comprehensive model of
opportunistic behavior). Under the economic approach, good faith can serve the inter-
ests of efficiency by relieving the parties of the cost and inconvenience of extensive
negotiation over such behavior. Like the other grand theory of contractual relations,
relational contract theory (see supra note 116), however, the economic approach to
good faith has had little impact in the courts. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note
71, at 414-15 (observing that "economic approaches have enjoyed limited endorsement
from the courts in contracts cases"); id. at 416-18 (analyzing the limitations of op-
portunism as a controlling consideration in good faith analysis); A. Brooke Overby,
Bondage, Domination, and the Art of the Deal: An Assessment of Judicial Strategies
in Lender Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 990-91 (1993)
(same); see also Fischel, supra, at 141 (acknowledging that "distinguishing opportu-
nistic from non-opportunistic behavior can be very complicated if not impossible").
But see infra notes 144-50, 181-92 and accompanying text (noting arguments by re-
cent textualist courts-most notably, Seventh Circuit Judges Easterbrook and
Posner-that the doctrine of good faith only serves as a "gap-filling" tool to disci-
pline opportunistic behavior).
126. Moreover, the duty of good faith will be of significance in other contexts be-
yond the exercise of contractual discretion, in particular when one party affirmative-
ly interferes with performance by the other, and in resolving issues a contract fails
to address at all. See infra notes 348-57 and accompanying text. This was the sub-
ject of an original objection by Professor Summers to the "foregone opportunities" ap-
proach advocated by Professor Burton. See Summers, supra note 9, at 834. But see
Burton, Reply, supra note 89, at 501-02 & n.24 (reaffirming that good faith may
play a role beyond limiting contractual discretion).
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of opinion now properly embraces the view that the duty of good
faith serves to protect the "reasonable" or "justified" expectations
that arise in the contracting process. 127 Of equal importance for
present purposes is emphasis on the role of good faith in the
context of discretionary powers. Here, as well, a solid consensus
currently exists in the courts that a core function of the duty of
good faith lies in imposing limitations on a party's exercise of a
discretionary power to control an aspect of a contractual rela-
tionship after formation.
12
A "justified expectations" approach, however, also affords
substantial deference to the express terms of the parties' con-
tract.129 The difficulty here, as Part II will show, is that the new
textualism adopts this emphasis on express terms, but fails to
acknowledge the significance of the broader expectations pro-
tected by the duty of good faith. Building on the insights gained
127. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text. In his subsequent work, Pro-
fessor Burton properly has placed greater emphasis on the inquiry into the "justified
expectations" that arise in the formation of a contractual relationship. See BURTON &
ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 40 (stating that, notwithstanding certain judicial recog-
nition of "foregone opportunities" terminology, a focus on the parties' "justified expec-
-tations . . . is a clearer way to express the same thought").
128. See, e.g., Kaplan v. First Options, Inc. (In re Kaplan), 143 F.3d 807, 818 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding that one important purpose of the duty of good faith is to "'check
the exercise of a party's discretion under a contract!" (quoting Bane v. Ferguson, 707
F. Supp. 988, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 890 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1989))); Amoco Oil
Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (same); Citicorp Sav. v.
Rucker, 692 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (same). Perhaps the best elab-
oration on this point came from Justice David Souter while he sat on the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire:
[U]nder an agreement that appears by word or silence to invest one
party with a degree of discretion in performance sufficient to deprive
another party of a substantial proportion of the agreement's value, the
parties' intent to be bound by an enforceable contract raises an implied
obligation of good faith to observe reasonable limits in exercising that
discretion, consistent with the parties' purpose or purposes in contracting.
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989); See also Dia-
mond & Foss, supra note 79, at 588 n.8 (citing older cases to the same effect); cf.
Summers, supra note 89, at 199 (agreeing that one of the functions of the duty of
good faith is to "prevent the abuse of powers conferred by contract").
129. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 63-64 (asserting the "[piriority of
[e]xpress [t]erms"); see also Burton, supra note 86, at 24 (urging a reformulation of
the official comments for the Code's definition of good faith to state that "[tihe ex-
press terms of the contract are of central importance in determining the content of
the good faith performance obligation").
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above, Part Ill will demonstrate that this new textualism is
fundamentally at odds with the essential role of the duty of good
faith performance, even in the face of express discretionary
powers.
II. GOOD FAITH AND THE ASCENDANCE OF NEW TEXTUALISM
Conventional wisdom holds, as we saw in brief outline
above,1"' that the "archaic absurdity"1"1 of the plain meaning
rule and its conceptual cousins has yielded to a flexible, contex-
tual approach in contractual interpretation." 2 In recent years,
however, the forces of formalism-never fully subdued in any
event-have staged an impressive comeback.la Paralleling simi-
lar developments in other interpretive contexts,'3 the last fifteen
years have witnessed an increasing judicial reliance on the clas-
sical premise that the express terms of a written contract reflect
the definitive source of interpretive evidence. 13 5
Indeed, in language strikingly reminiscent of its classical past,
judicial interpretation of contracts now often begins and ends
with a review of the text and a simple citation to the force of the
"plain meaning" and "parol evidence" rules.3 6 This trend has led
130. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
131. Murray, supra note 35, at 1344.
132. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
133. Professors Goetz and Scott observed as early as 1985 that "an examination of
recent cases challenges the conventional premise that methods of contractual inter-
pretation have evolved over the past half-century from an extreme focus on narrow
'plain meaning' to the opposite pole of liberal contextual construction." Goetz &
Scott, supra note 49, at 264.
134. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing the reemergence of for-
malism in the interpretation of statutes and treaties).
135. A number of scholars have observed this phenomenon. See Goetz & Scott, su-
pra note 49, at 307 (noting the conventional wisdom that the plain meaning and
parol evidence rules have been abandoned but concluding that "[in numerous cases,
courts ... still invoke the primacy of express, written texts to exclude extrinsic evi-
dence"); Mooney, supra note 7, at 1159-69 (observing that there has been a growing
reliance on the plain meaning and parol evidence rules in the late 1980s and 1990s);
Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1713 (1997) (arguing that "it would be wrong... to as-
sume that American contract law has abandoned the hierarchical notion of contract
interpretation and supplementation" that gives primacy to express terms over im-
plied meaning).
136. The language of these recent opinions is striking for its similarity with the
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one recent commentator to describe the "conventional" approach
to contract interpretation as holding that "[ilf the language of
the contract is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for in-
terpretation or construction .... Its meaning is determined
without reference to extrinsic evidence."'37
This rising tide of textualism has spread even to the role of
the duty of good faith performance. The new strain of
textualism, similar to its nineteenth-century ancestor, 138 threat-
ens to (re)consign the notion of good faith performance to the
margins of contract doctrine.
A. The Return of Textualism in Good Faith Analysis
For a time following its recognition in the UCC, the doctrine
of good faith performance experienced a warm reception in the
courts. In this early flowering of the doctrine, courts properly
understood that the doctrine retains significance even in the face
of an express grant of discretion under the contract.1' 9 The apo-
approach of classical formalism. See, e.g., Church v. General Motors Corp., 74 F.3d
795, 799 (7th Cir. 1996) ("If the language unambiguously answers the question at
issue, the inquiry is over."); Grey v. FDIC, No. 88 Civ. 7452 (MJLTHK), 1998 WL
483460, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1998) ("The Court should accord the words and
phrases of the contract their plain meaning .... [Wihere the contractual language
unambiguously conveys the parties' intent, 'extrinsic evidence may not properly be
received, nor may a judicial preference be interjected since these extraneous factors
would vary the effect of the contract's terms'" (citations omitted) (quoting Seiden
Assocs., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir. 1992))); Waynesboro
Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Properties, 496 S.E.2d 64, 67 (Va. 1998) ("'[Wlhere an agree-
ment is complete on its face, is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the court is not
at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself. . . . This is so
because the writing is the repository of the final agreement of the parties.' (cita-
tions omitted)).
137. Zamir, supra note 135, at 1715-16 (concluding that the "conventional hierar-
chy" of contract interpretation embraces the full force of the plain meaning and par-
ol evidence rules).
138. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
139. Prior to the 1990s, a number of courts invoked the duty of good faith as a
limit on express contractual rights. See, e.g., Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1987); Larese v. Creamland Dair-
ies, Inc., 767 F.2d 716, 717 (10th Cir. 1985); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d
873, 880-83 (8th Cir. 1979); Baker v. Ratzlaff, 564 P.2d 153, 156-57 (Kan. Ct. App.
1977); Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 351 A.2d 349, 351-52
(N.J. 1976).
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theosis of this flexible approach came in the now famous case of
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.140 There, the Sixth Circuit found a
breach of the duty of good faith in a bank's surprise refusal to
advance additional funds under a discretionary line of credit,
even though the loan documents expressly provided that all
amounts were payable on demand by the bank.'
Like other social activities, however, the practice of contract
interpretation appears to fall under the influence of trends. That
is, as one approach begins to establish itself, a countertrend
often emerges." In this light, the response to the perceived
excessive liberality reflected in K.M.C. was perhaps predictable:
Recent years have witnessed an increasing judicial hostility to
the duty of good faith performance in favor of an increased reli-
ance on the normative force of contractual text.'4
140. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
141. See id. at 760-63 (holding that the duty of good faith in that context required
either sufficient advance notice or "some objective basis upon which a reasonable
loan officer in the exercise of his discretion would have acted in that manner"). For
a more detailed examination of KM.C., see Steve H. Nickles, The Objectification of
Debtor-Creditor Relations, 74 MINN. L. REV. 371, 385 (1989) (suggesting that the
objective approach embraced in KM.C. was appropriate under the circumstances);
Patterson, supra note 48, at 180-84. Other courts from the same time period pro-
duced similar holdings. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987)
(following KM.C. with regard to a demand note); Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding a breach of good faith in the use of an accelera-
tion clause as a pretext to advance the due date of a loan).
142. See Van Alstine, supra note 3, at 717 (observing a similar pattern regarding
the interpretation of statutes and treaties).
143. The criticism of the ultimate holding in KM.C. has been particularly severe.
In a line of opinions too long to capture in a footnote, subsequent courts have reject-
ed the premise of KM.C. that a demand note could be subject to an implied obliga-
tion of good faith. See, e.g., Pavco Indus., Inc. v. First Natl Bank, 534 So. 2d 572,
577 (Ala. 1988); Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n v. SunAmp Sys., Inc., 838 P.2d 1314,
1322-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485
So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Natl
Bank, 605 A.2d 609, 613-14 (Me. 1992); Check Reporting Servs., Inc. v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 478 N.W.2d 893, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain
State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Solar Motors, Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 537 N.W.2d 527, 539 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 545 N.W.2d 714 (1996);
Gaul v. Olympia Fitness Ctr., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 1281, 1287-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993);
Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151,
154-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). See also National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross,
130 B.R. 656, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that KM.C. is inconsistent with New
York law, which the KM.C. court purported to apply), affd, 962 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
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The paradigm for this new approach is the equally famous
case of Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank.144 Al-
though the case involved the subordination of a bank's priority
claim in bankruptcy for "inequitable conduct,"45  Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit took the occasion to expound
on the contractual duty of good faith.' The specific issue of
contention, familiarly, was a bank's refusal to advance funds
under a loan agreement that reserved for the bank an express
right to terminate financing at any time.'47
In Judge Easterbrook's view, this express discretionary power
ended the matter of good faith: "Although courts often refer to
the obligation of good faith that exists in every contractual rela-
tion, this is not an invitation to the court to decide whether one
party ought to have exercised privileges expressly reserved in
the document."141 Instead, Judge Easterbrook reasoned, the duty
of good faith only serves a residual gap-filling role of forbidding
"opportunistic" conduct in a way that "could not have been con-
templated at the time of drafting, and.., therefore was not
resolved explicitly by the parties."49 In language that now has
become the shibboleth of the new textualist approach, the Kham
& Nate's court thus held that principles of good faith "do not
block use of terms that actually appear in the contract." 5 '
Were this an isolated opinion, there would be little reason for
concern. One can fairly conclude, however, that Kham & Nate's
1992).
144. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). For a particularly critical analysis of Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in Kham & Nate's, see Patterson, supra note 15, at 513-29.
145. Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1353-54, 1357.
146. See id. at 1357-58.
147. See id. at 1353.
148. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
149. Id. ("'Good faith' is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take
opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time
of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.").
150. Id. It is no coincidence that Judge Easterbrook has been at the forefront of
the new textualist approach to contract interpretation, for he has been one of the
leading champions of a restrictive textualist approach to the interpretation of stat-
utes as well. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 533
(1983) (advocating a limited role for judges in interpreting statutes); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 61 (1994) (urging greater reliance on text in statutory interpretation).
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marked a significant change in the course of the law. Indeed,
after that opinion in 1990, an initial trickle of similar views in
the case law.5 began to grow into a torrent, even as a few early
commentators voiced their disapproval.'52 In a long and growing
list of opinions, courts from a number of jurisdictions" have
parroted the view that the duty of good faith "cannot supplant
express contract terms."" This textualist approach has likewise
151. See, e.g., Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 877-
78 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the duty of good faith has "no role to play" in the
face of an express contractual right); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448
N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that good faith cannot supplant express contract
terms); see also Corey R. Chivers, Note, 'Contracting Around" the Good Faith Cove-
nant to Avoid Lender Liability, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 377 n.62 (citing ear-
lier cases supporting this proposition).
152. See Barbara A. Fure, Contracts as Literature: A Hermeneutic Approach to the
Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Loan Agreements, 31
DUQ. L. REv. 729, 758-62 (1993) (criticizing the approach in Kham & Nate's for mis-
understanding the importance of reasonable expectations in good faith analysis);
Patterson, supra note 15 (same). But see Overby, supra note 125, at 1023 (arguing
that "[i]n the lending context, the 'effectiveness of express terms' approach, as set
out in Kham & Nate's, is the preferable methodology to use in enforcing the parties'
agreement").
153. Not surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit has remained at the forefront of this
new textualist approach to the duty of good faith. See, e.g., L.P.D., Inc. v. General
Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that good faith cannot block
"explicit provisions of contracts"); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc.,
73 F.3d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that good faith does not require a man-
ufacturer to continue its relationship with a dealer after a valid termination); Indus-
trial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 1996) (re-
jecting a good faith claim where contract permitted termination without cause); Orig-
inal Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d
273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, in the face of an express clause, contract law
does not impose a duty to be reasonable); Continental Bank, N. v. Everett, 964
F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1992) ("As a method to fill gaps, [good faith] has ... noth-
ing to do with the enforcement of terms actually negotiated.").
154. Abbott v. Amoco Oil Co., 619 N.E.2d 789, 796-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (quoting
Foster Enters., Inc. v. Germania Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 421 N.E.2d 1375, 1382 (I1.
App. Ct. 1981)). A list of cases in this textualist vein limited even to the last few
years scarcely can be contained in a single footnote. See, e.g., Taylor Equip., Inc. v.
John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding the implied duty not
applicable to an express contractual requirement of approval for the assignment of a
dealership), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1553 (1997); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Linch, 36 F.3d
370, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding implied covenant of good faith should not over-
ride express terms); Hall v. Resolution Trust Corp., 958 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1992)
("[Aln 'agreement made by the parties and embodied in the contract itself cannot be
varied by an implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'" (quoting Exxon Corp. v.
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been invoked in a wide variety of contexts. Thus, courts have
concluded that the duty of good faith becomes irrelevant in the
face of any discretionary power, for example, to terminate a
contract, 155 to preclude assignment of a contract,156 to refuse con-
sent to the relocation of a dealership 57 (or to establish a compet-
ing one in the same market5 8 ), to cease operation under a
lease, 159 or to set banking fees or loan interest rates. 160
Atlantic Richfield Co., 678 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. 1984))); Allen v. Cornish & Carey,
No. 96-20254 SW, 1997 WL 195433, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1997) (holding that
the duty of good faith cannot "obliterate a right expressly provided by a written
contract"); Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
("The implied covenant of good faith should not be invoked to .override the express
terms of the agreement between the parties."); Cenex, Inc. v. Arrow Gas Serv., 896
F. Supp. 1574, 1580-81 (D. Wyo. 1995) (same); James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 835, 843-44 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that the implied duty did not "override
the express terms of the agreement" which "unmistakably" granted a defendant the
right to take the disputed action); Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev.
Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 728 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the implied duty of good faith
"'is plainly subject to the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of
the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct which would
otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing'" (quoting VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 777-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1969))); Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 752-53 (Ct.
App. 1995) (finding implied covenant of good faith should not override express
terms); Farris v. Hutchinson, 838 P.2d 374, 376-77 (Mont. 1992) (same); see also
Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 587 n.5 (listing additional cases in the same
vein).
155. See, e.g., Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d
Cir. 1985); Friedman & Son, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 712 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1985).
156. See, e.g., Taylor Equip., 98 F.3d at 1031-32; James, 806 F. Supp. at 839, 843;
First Fed. Say. Bank v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 603-04 (Ind. 1990).
157. See, e.g., Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 876-
79 (5th Cir. 1989); Thoroughbred Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 908 S.W.2d 719, 733-
34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
158. See, e.g., Barnes, 932 F. Supp. at 1437-40; Burger King Corp. v. Holder, 844
F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
159. See, e.g., Rothe v. Revco D.S., Inc., 976 F. Supp. 784, 794-95 (S.D. Ind. 1997)
(holding that "bad faith only becomes an issue if a good faith clause was in the
lease"), aft'd, 148 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1998); Fodor v. First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc.,
No. 58587, 1990 WL 93210, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 5, 1990), affd, 589 N.E.2d 17
(Ohio 1992).
160. See, e.g., Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding
no duty of good faith with regard to a clause permitting adjustment of the interest
rate under a loan agreement); Tolbert v. First Nat'l Bank, 823 P.2d 965, 968-71 (Or.
1991) (same as to banking fees). The issue of lender liability for breach of the duty
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With this reemergence of the definitive power of text, the
exclusion of parol evidence in good faith claims could not be far
behind. Indeed, a number of courts have now expressly conclud-
ed that a party may not introduce extrinsic evidence to support
a good faith claim in the face of an express contractual power.161
The purity of this adherence to text thus permits a court to
dispense with an analysis of good faith without even reviewing
the context in which a discretionary power arose in the first
place.
A recent decision of the Eighth Circuit, Taylor Equipment,
Inc. v. John Deere Co.,1" 2 illustrates how little remains of the
duty of good faith under this view. In Taylor Equipment, a jury
found that a manufacturer breached the duty of good faith when
of good faith performance has spawned a considerable body of scholarly analysis.
See, e.g., PATrERSON, supra note 50; Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffn, Good Faith
and Fair Dealing in Commercial Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and
Beyond, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1237 (1989); Carolyn M. Edwards, Article 3 Demand Notes
and the Doctrine of Good Faith, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 481 (1991); Fischel, supra note
125; Fure, supra note 152; William H. Lawrence & Robert D. Wilson, Good Faith in
Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63 IND. L.J.
825 (1988); Nickles, supra note 141; Overby, supra note 125, at 1011-1016 (arguing
that courts have substantially accepted a "passive/'effectiveness of express terms' ap-
proach" to the duty of good faith in that context); Patterson, supra note 15; Jona-
than K. Van Patten, Lender Liability: Changing or Enforcing the Ground Rules?, 33
S.D. L. REv. 387 (1988).
161. See, e.g., Kamm v. Trust Co., No. 92-55289, 1994 WL 666081, at *4 (9th Cir.
Nov. 28, 1994) (precluding the introduction of parol evidence to support a claim
based on duty of good faith); Burnette Techno-Metrics, Inc. v. TSI Inc., 44 F.3d 641,
643 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); H.L. Miller Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Davenport Mach., No. 97
C 5012, 1998 WL 341828, at *3-4 (N.D. IM. June 18, 1998) (same); Physiotherapy
Assocs. v. Patenaude, No. C-95-20545 BMW, 1995 WL 381950, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June
21, 1995) (same); Implement Serv., Inc. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 726 F. Supp. 1171,
1179-80 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that an express termination clause precluded the
introduction of parol evidence to support a claim based on the duty of good faith);
Solar Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 537 N.W.2d 527, 539 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting both a specific breach of contract and a breach of the duty of good faith
claim "for the reason that the parol evidence rule prevents one from establishing a
cause of action for contract upon a hodgepodge of negotiations and preliminary
agreements"), affd, 545 N.W.2d 714 (Neb. 1996); State Nafl Bank v. Academia, Inc.,
802 S.W.2d 282, 294 (Tex. App. 1990) ("[Cilaims based on breach of [an] oral agree-
ment would be contrary to the written contract, and therefore cannot form the basis
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . ").
162. 98 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying South Dakota law), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1553 (1997).
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it arbitrarily invoked a contractual provision requiring its "writ-
ten consent" for the assignment of a dealership.'6 The Eighth
Circuit reversed, finding as a matter of law that the duty of good
faith imposed no limitation on the manufacturer's conduct.' In
pure textualist spirit, the court held that the absence of an ex-
press limitation meant that the manufacturer had an "absolute
right" to refuse consent.165 "Absent contractual limitation," the
court reasoned, the contract gave the dealer no "justified expec-
tation" that the manufacturer's discretion would be subject to
any external limitation.'66 Without analyzing the context in
which the consent clause arose, the court then quickly concluded
with the now familiar statement that the duty of good faith
"cannot 'block use of terms that actually appear in the con-
tract."' 67
Under this textualist approach to the duty of good faith, in
short, every express contractual power renders irrelevant any
"implied" obligations imposed by the doctrine of good faith per-
formance. 6 ' Indeed, as discussed in the introduction to this
Article, recent courts have even begun to express frustration
163. See id. at 1029-30.
164. See id. at 1031-35.
165. Id. at 1033; see also id. at 1034 ("The normal meaning of the approval
clause . . . is that [the manufacturer] has an unrestricted right to withhold ap-
proval .... ).
166. Id. at 1032-33; see also Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873
F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding the same with regard to the relocation of an
auto dealership under Michigan law). But see BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at
132-33 (criticizing the Hubbard reasoning, if not the ultimate result, for failing to
view such a discretionary power as subject to the duty of good faith).
167. Taylor Equip., 98 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett,
964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1992)).
168. Some scholars also accept the view that the duty of good faith becomes irrele-
vant in the face of "express terms" of a contract. See, e.g., Diamond & Foss, supra
note 79, at 587 & n.5 (arguing that the covenant of good faith is merely a residual
"gap-filling default rule" that "cannot be used to override or contradict the express
terms of the contract"); Overby, supra note 125, at 1023 (arguing that "[in the lend-
ing context, the 'effectiveness of express terms' approach, as set out in Kham &
Nate's, is the preferable methodology to use in enforcing the parties' agreement"); cf
Fure, supra note 152, at 734 (arguing that "the duty of good faith is really nothing
more than the basic contract principle that each party's reasonable expectations
should be satisfied according to the agreement, as determined by manifestations of
intent").
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with suggestions to the contrary. Recall as a fitting conclusion to
this stage of our analysis the Seventh Circuit's recent reprimand
issued to a plaintiff: "More often than we care to. recall, we have
reminded litigants that... [they] may not seek to litigate issues
of 'good faith' in lieu of abiding by explicit provisions of con-
tracts."169
B. The Implications of the New Textualism for the Future of
Good Faith
Similar to the drift of contract interpretation in general, the
rise of the new textualist approach to the duty of good faith
signals a return to the formalist presumptions of late nine-
teenth-century contract law.170 Like its classical ancestor, this
rejuvenated textualism proceeds on the premise that every ex-
press contractual term reflects the parties' final agreement on
the subject.171 As a consequence, defining contractual rights and
obligations involves little more than pressing the "meaning" (the
"right answer") out of the words that appear in a contractual
document.172
With this foundation, the implications for the textualist view
of contractual good faith become clear: Because the parties are
able to distill the totality of their understandings into express
agreements, every grant of a contractual power is presumptively
absolute. That is, the failure of the parties to include an express
limitation on a discretionary power is taken as an affirmative
agreement between them that no such limitation exists.1 71 Mat-
169. L.P.D., Inc. v. General Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997); see
also supra notes 1, 5 and accompanying text (noting that even Justice (then Judge)
Scalia once warned that such a reliance on the authority of text will strip the doc-
trine of good faith of any power).
170. See supra notes 27-45 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional "plain
meaning" and "parol evidence" rules); see also Patterson, supra note 15, at 515 (ar-
guing that "[t]he opinion in Kham [& Nate's] is replete with statements that could
have been uttered by any proponent of nineteenth-century formalism").
171. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (noting an increasing judicial
reliance on the express terms of a written contract as the definitive source of inter-
pretive evidence).
172. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Taylor Equip. Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that the absence of an express limitation on a manufacturer's right to
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ters of discretion in the performance of a contract in such cases
thus provide no occasion for judicial analysis of good faith at
all.174
Moreover, consonant with the spirit of the classical plain
meaning and parol evidence rules, this new approach (in its
extreme form) precludes consideration of any contextual evi-
dence on the "implied" duty of good faith that would undermine
the terms the parties have seen fit to reduce to writing.175 One
thus commonly finds in the new textualist case law on the sub-
withhold consent to assignment meant that the right was unrestricted "as a matter
of law"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1553 (1997); General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Air-
craft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1041 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a claim of bad faith termi-
nation on the reasoning that "[i]f [plaintiffi had wanted specific provisions in the
contract concerning what cause would be necessary for termination of the agreement,
it could have insisted on the inclusion of those terms"); Rothe v. Revco D.S., Inc.,
976 F. Supp. 784, 794-95 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding with regard to a lease contract
that "bad faith only becomes an issue if a good faith clause was in the lease");
Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1436 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting a
breach of good faith claim because the contract at issue did not expressly limit the
defendant's right to take the challenged action); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of
Am. v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating with
regard to a good faith claim that where the contract "lacks specific language pre-
venting plaintiff from unreasonably withholding consent, the Court can not and
should not rewrite the contract to include such language which neither of the parties
saw fit to insert in the contract").
174. As recently as a few years ago, Professors Burton and Andersen were able to
suggest that such a proposition had found little or no acceptance in the courts: "The
courts could leave all discretion in performance unbridled.... Every instance of
contracted flexibility or lack of clarity would be treated as an assumption of risk. No
U.S. court now takes this approach, though many will respect a clear agreement of
the parties that discretion should be unbridled." BURTON & ANDERSON, supra note 71,
at 46-47. As noted in the previous footnote, however, a number of recent textualist
courts have credited a failure to include an express limitation as such a "clear
agreement" that contractual discretion should be insulated entirely from any obliga-
tions imposed by the doctrine of good faith performance.
175. In practical consequence, therefore, the "duty" of good faith is dismissed with
a simple syllogism: The unambiguous terms of a writing reflect the final repository
of the parties' agreement; the plain meaning and parol evidence rules preclude re-
sort to any "implied" obligations that would undermine that agreement; as an "im-
plied" term, therefore, good faith is irrelevant with regard to terms "that actually
appear in the contract." Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d
1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Patterson, supra note 15, at 524 (observing that
in Kham & Nate's, Judge Easterbrook "rejected the notion that the agreement of the
parties is to be found anywhere other than in the express written terms of the
parties' agreement").
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ject the familiar adage of classical contract law that "[wihere
parties have addressed an issue in the contract, 'no occasion to
divine their intent or supply implied terms arises."176
This new hostility to the duty of good faith has led a few
courts to the point of near absurdity in the defense of express
contract terms. Consider as an example the recent case of
Barnes v. Burger King Corp.17 The court in Barnes began an
analysis of a breach of good faith claim with the stock statement
that the duty of good faith cannot "override the express terms"
of the parties' agreement.178 It then observed that a party cannot
maintain such a claim "absent an allegation that an express
term of the contract has been breached."179 This is a tidy logical
circle: The duty of good faith performance cannot override an
express term in a contract, and is irrelevant in absence of a
breach of an express term. If a breach of an express term al-
ready exists, however, it is difficult to see where the duty of
good faith would fit in the law of contracts at all. 8 '
To be sure, some new textualists acknowledge a residual gap-
filling role for the duty of good faith when "the contract is
silent."'' Close examination, however, reveals that much of even
this is a semantic distinction without a substantive difference.
Recall that in Kham & Nate's, for example, the Seventh Circuit
176. Taylor Equip., 98 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 175 n.13 (8th Cir. 1987)).
177. 932 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
178. Id. at 1438.
179. Id. at 1439; see also Miller v. United States Bank, 865 P.2d 536 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (rejecting a good faith claim because there was no claim of a breach of
an express term of the contract); cf. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 414 n.1
(describing Miller as an "oddball" opinion).
180. But see Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587 (N.J. 1997)
(holding that the defendant's pretermination conduct in frustration of the plaintiffs
reasonable expectations breached the duty of good faith performance even though the
conduct at issue did not violate any express contractual term); Garrett v. BankWest,
Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 841 (S.D. 1990) (allowing a claim for breach of the duty of
good faith performance "even though the conduct failed to violate any of the express
terms of the contract agreed by the parties").
181. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990); see also Taylor Equip., 98 F.3d at 1032 (observing that good faith is a "meth-
od to fill gaps" in a contract); American Laser Prods., Inc. v. National Imaging Sup-
plies Group, Inc., No. 94c 7624, 1996 WL 134256, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1996)
("[Tihe duty of good faith is used by courts solely to fill in gaps in the contract").
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described the duty of good faith as merely forbidding "opportu-
nistic" conduct that "could not have been contemplated" at the
time of drafting.8 2 Assuming, as surely we must with Judge
Easterbrook, that this is not simply shoddy drafting,8 ' the duty
of good faith would in fact authorize opportunistic advantage-
taking, as long as the parties "could have" imagined it at the
time of contracting. In the place of a duty of good faith, there-
fore, the law requires that the parties negotiate over and ex-
pressly proscribe all conceivable forms of "bad faith."
This conceptualization of the gap-filling role of good faith
nonetheless is fully consistent with the new textualist approach
to the duty in general. Recall that this view proceeds from the
premise that every express discretionary power is presumptively
unlimited, and thus not subject to any "implied" limitations that
could arise from a duty of good faith.'" The consequence is that
the burden of particularization, of identifying and describing in
the text of the contract the specific limitations as to the future
exercise of that discretion, falls on the "dependent" party."8 5 As
explained below, this stands the duty of good faith performance
on its figurative head. 86
At the core of the new textualism is a fear that the duty of
good faith will become a means for judicial meddling with "sol-
emn contracts" in the name of paternalism or mandated altru-
ism.8 7 Indeed, no less than the entire institution of contract
182. Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1357.
183. This language in the Kham & Nate's opinion, in any event, has now been
embraced by a number of subsequent courts. See, e.g., Jones Distrib. Co., v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1445, 1465-66 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Waslow v. MNC
Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 123 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Bennett v. Genoa Ag. Ctr. Inc. (In re Bennett), 154 B.R. 140, 153-54 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1992); Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Society Natl Bank, 662 N.E.2d 1074,
1082-83 (Ohio 1996); see also MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v.
Zadikoff, 995 F. Supp. 929, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that a trademark licensor's
exercise of a discretionary power was not subject to the duty of good faith because
the possibility that it might act "unreasonably" in this regard "was one that clearly
could have been contemplated at the time of drafting").
184. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
185. The designation "dependent" party for the party that is subject to another's
exercise of contractual discretion derives from Professor Steven Burton. See Burton,
Reply, supra note 89, at 507.
186. See infra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
187. See Market Street Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th
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hangs in the balance of this debate. "Unless pacts are enforced
according to their terms," Judge Easterbrook warned in Klam &
Nate's, "the institution of contract, with all the advantages pri-
vate negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized." 88 In the
buzzwords of classical formalism, to do otherwise "would reduce
commercial certainty and breed costly litigation."'
What remains, then, is a "duty" of good faith performance that
only rarely applies and is of limited force when it does. Although
one of its prime functions is to limit the abuse of discretionary
powers, the new textualist approach views all such express pow-
ers as entirely beyond the influence of the duty of good faith.190
Even as a "residual" gap-filling tool, the duty can only discipline
conduct that the parties "could not have contemplated" at the
time of drafting.'9 ' This continuing contraction of the scope of
the duty of good faith has led at least one prominent judge to
conclude that modern contract law "could of course do without
the term 'good faith,' and maybe even without the doctrine."'92
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) ("The contractual duty of good faith is . . .not some newfan-
gled bit of welfare-state paternalism or ... the sediment of an altruistic strain in
contract law"); Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1357 ("[Kinowledge that literal enforce-
ment means some mismatch between the parties' expectation and the outcome does
not imply a general duty of Indness' in performance, or of judicial oversight into
whether a party had 'good cause' to act as it did."); General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 703 F. Supp. 637, 644 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("The implied covenant of
good faith cannot be used by the Court as a tool for rewriting the parties' Agree-
ment based on unspecified notions of fairness."), affd, 915 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir. 1990).
188. Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1357 ("Firms that have negotiated contracts are
entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading
partners, without being mulcted for lack of 'good faith.'").
189. Id. Some recent courts even have attempted to return the duty of good faith
to its modest beginnings. Echoing its historical antecedent in classical contract law,
one recent court has suggested that the duty of good faith "requires only 'that one
party not make it impossible for the other party to perform the contract.'" Burnette
Techno-Metrics, Inc. v. TSI Inc., 44 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)
(quoting American Warehousing & Distrib., Inc. v. Michael Ede Management, Inc.,
414 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)); see also H Enters. Intl, Inc. v. General
Elec. Capital Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1405, 1420 (D. Minn. 1993) (same). But see White
Stone Partners, LP v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 978 F. Supp. 878, 881 n.2 (D. Minn. 1997)
(suggesting that these cases misread Minnesota law).
190. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
192. Market Street Assocs., 941 F.2d at 596 (Posner, J.) (affirming nonetheless a
denial of summary judgment on a good faith claim because of opportunistic behavior
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In this light, the quotation from then-Judge Antonin Scalia
with which this Article began takes on a meaning beyond mere
rhetorical hyperbole. 193 To be sure, there is a core of truth in the
argument that contracting parties retain the ability, through
sufficiently explicit and informed agreements, to grant to one (or
both) of them an unrestricted discretionary power on a specific
subject. 19 Moreover, not all courts have fallen to the allure of
textualism in the analysis of contractual good faith.'95 Nonethe-
less, if the extreme form of the new restrictive trend continues
to gain momentum, we should take seriously the admonition
that to view every express contractual power as absolute and
by the defendant years after the conclusion of the contract at issue). This is simply
an express statement of what is implicit in much of the new textualist approach to
the duty of good faith. Judge Posner has suggested that contract law would be
equally well served with a return to the common-law notions of strict interpretation
and a reliance on "such implied conditions as are necessary to make sense of the
contract." Id.
193. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant passage in full).
In Tymshare, Justice Scalia himself appeared to endorse the view that the doctrine
of good faith is merely a modem version of the expanded "implied promise theory"
as reflected in the early stages of the doctrine. See Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727
F.2d 1145, 1152-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (suggesting that good faith may be synonymous
with the notion of "implied contractual obligations and limitations"); see also supra
notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the early recognition of the doctrine
of good faith).
194. See infra notes 282-325 and accompanying text. Even this power is subject to
the limitation that such delegated discretion cannot render the parties' agreement
illusory. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Olympic Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 959 F. Supp. 918,
922 (N.D. 111. 1997) (holding that, although an automobile manufacturer "reserve[d]
to itself discretion in accepting orders and distributing Motor Vehicles, and [deemed]
its judgments and decisions [] final," such discretion was nonetheless subject to the
duty of good faith); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 499 (Colo. 1995) (en banc)
(affirming a jury verdict against lessor for bad faith calculation of rental charges
even though contract granted lessor the discretion to set rent); Olympus Hills Shop-
ping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (affirming a jury verdict that supermarket breached duty of good faith by
converting to discount store even though the contract permitted it to operate "any
lawful retail selling business"); cf. Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d
575, 587 (N.J. 1997) ("The obligation to perform in good faith exists in every con-
tract, including those contracts that contain express and unambiguous provisions
permitting either party to terminate the contract without cause."). For further cases
in the same vein, see infra note 300. See also infra note 301 (citing cases that have
held that even "sole discretion" clauses are subject to the duty of good faith).
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unrestricted "is virtually to read the doctrine of good faith...
out of existence."'96
III. TExT, EXPECTATION, AND THE "IMMUTABILITY" OF GOOD FAITH
It should not come as a surprise that the doctrine of good
faith and fair dealing has become a focal point for controversy
amidst the rising tide of textualism in contract law. At its core,
the doctrine reflects the conviction that-in the case of discre-
tionary powers at least-the interests of parties to contractual
relationships are best served by a presumption in favor of flexi-
bility over one of certainty, of fair and reasonable conduct over
unrestricted self-interest. At some ill-defined level, therefore,
this "mandatory" duty of good faith operates as an external
standard that is not entirely dependent upon the force of party
autonomy.
Adding fuel to the controversy is the fact that the doctrine of
good faith admits of almost infinite elasticity. "I]t is a chame-
leon," as Judge Posner once famously described it.197 As with all
broad abstractions designed to govern practical circumstances, in
other words, notions such as "good faith" and "fair dealing"
mean little in isolation; they take on functional content only in
the context of a specific human relation and the particular cir-
cumstances of their application.' Such doctrinal abstraction
likewise creates a risk of "self-deception" by scholars and judges
as they seek to give content to its amorphous directives.'99
196. Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1154.
197. Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir.
1988).
198. It is this fact in particular that has frustrated attempts to distill from the
doctrine of "good faith" a unified, comprehensive norm that broadly requires coopera-
tion and continual adjustment of contractual obligations, or that alternatively merely
advances a goal of contractual "efficiency." See supra note 116 (discussing relational
contract theory), and 125 (discussing an economic approach to good faith). For an in-
teresting analysis of the similarities between these two broad theories, see Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements
and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 275-78 (1992) (suggesting, with the
assumption that most commercial parties would prefer efficient "default rules," that
a relational approach founded on the presumed intentions of the parties is essential-
ly the same as a law and economics approach).
199. See Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for
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This Part examines the particular forms of "self-deception" at
the core of the new textualist approach to the duty of good faith
performance. The first section examines the textualist misappre-
hension of the nature of the expectations protected by the duty
of good faith. The second section then turns to an analysis of
this new restrictive trend's flawed factual and normative founda-
tions.
This Part concludes with a positive examination of the power
of the parties to influence the content of their obligation of good
faith. In the final section, we will see that contractors may in-
deed agree to confer on one party a discretionary right that is
insulated from external standards of fair and reasonable con-
duct. I argue there, however, that the burden of expression to
achieve that end should be a substantial one, and should fall de-
cidedly on the party seeking to secure such rights.
A. "Interpretation," Good Faith, and the Force of Expectation
Like many misguided theories, the primary error in the new
textualist approach to the duty of good faith lies less in the logic
of its analysis than in the assumptions with which that analysis
begins. The first such premise is that the only relevant under-
standings and expectations in interpretive inquiries are those
that have found their way into the express terms of the parties'
writing.00 From this foundation, it is indeed but a small step to
the conclusion that an express contractual power permits an
interpreter to dispense with an analysis of "good faith" in the
exercise of that power.2 '
This approach fundamentally misapprehends the nature of
the expectations protected by the duty of good faith performance.
The new textualism in fact goes astray even at the level of "in-
terpretation" in the narrow sense of divining the "meaning" of
contractual text. As shown above, the flexible interpretive ap-
proach sanctioned in the Uniform Commercial Code,"2 now fol-
the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 397 (1975) ("[Olur capacity for
self-deception increases as the level of abstraction gets higher.").
200. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
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lowed in substance by the Second Restatement of Contracts,°3
rejects the rigid formalism of classical common-law interpreta-
tion. Instead, the Code embraces a flexible, contextual under-
standing of contractual obligations. 204 Thus, the determinative
inquiry into the actual "agreement" of the parties is not limited
to the language the parties employ; rather, it extends to under-
standings that arise by implication from other circumstances as
well, including the past experiences, practices, and relationship
of the parties. °5
The express terms of a writing remain, of course, the prime
source for interpretive evidence.206 The core message here, how-
ever, is that the modern approach to interpretation sweeps away
the classical premise that express terms reflect the final reposi-
tory of relevant evidence for defining contractual rights and
obligations.20 7 In its place now stands a flexible search for con-
tent and meaning, in text and context, experience and practice,
and even the conduct of the parties in performance.08
Properly appreciated, the doctrine of good faith performance
serves as a final, flexible component in this realist understand-
ing of the contracting process. At its most elemental level, the
203. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
204. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1995) (explaining that the purposes of the Code are to
"permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties" and that the provisions of the Code are to "be liberally
construed").
205. Id. § 1-201 cmt. 3 (stating that the Code concept of agreement "is intended to
include full recognition of usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance
and the surrounding circumstances as effective parts thereof"); see supra notes 50-52,
55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the parties' "bargain in
fact" in defining contractual rights and obligations).
206. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
express terms under both the UCC and the Second Restatement). The precept of the
primary importance of express terms also operates subject to the more powerful di-
rective that an interpreter first exhaust all reasonable means of reconciling the vari-
ous interpretive sources. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (citing U.C.C. §§
1-205(4), 2-208(2), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (1981)); see also
PEB COMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15, at 4 ("The concept of agreement is not
limited to the terms of the parties' writing; it includes a variety of elements, all of
which must be synthesized."); Patterson, supra note 15, at 524 (providing the source
from which this statement clearly is derived).
207. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
208. See id.
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doctrine reflects the simple idea that some expectations may be
so fundamental or obvious to the parties that neither sees a
necessity to raise them in negotiations (if negotiations occur at
all), nor certainly to demand that they be reduced to writing.20 9
Beyond even the notions of usage of trade and its conceptual
cousins,210 the duty of good faith thus enriches our understand-
ing of the circumstances that can explain, supplement, or even
qualify the express terms of the parties' agreement.21  The duty
operates, in other words, as an unspoken clarifier and qualifier,
as an indispensable adjective in a field of the parties' agreed
nouns.
In this sense, then, the duty of good faith repudiates the
textualist notion that an interpreter can wring the full volume of
the parties' contractual relationship from the skin of their ex-
press contract.2u The essential function of that duty is, rather,
to direct attention to the spirit of the parties' deal,213 to the less
209. Arthur Corbin long ago recognized that such considerations lie at the heart of
the duty of good faith. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 86, § 570(A) (Supp. 1998) (arguing
that the duty of good faith "is but a recognition that the parties occasionally have
understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that they did not need to
negotiate about those expectations"); see also infra notes 247-63 (exploring this point
in greater detail).
210. See U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (noting that the duty of good faith is not limited to,
but is only "further implemented by Section 1-205 on course of dealing and usage of
trade" and that the doctrine of good faith "directs a court towards interpreting con-
tracts within the commercial context in which they are created" (emphasis added)).
211. See supra notes 52-54, 63 (explaining that under both the UCC and the Sec-
ond Restatement, implied terms such as usages of trade and courses of dealing and
performance can "give[] meaning to or supplement [] or qualifLy]" the terms of the
parties' agreement).
212. What is particularly astonishing about the rise of the new textualism is that
this point found recognition-although in limited fashion-in some of the earliest
treatments of the duty of good faith:
[in addition to the more familiar sources of standards of perfor-
mance-for example, the contract language itself, case law on how con-
tract gaps are to be filled, and custom and usage--judges turn to specific
concepts of good faith in deciding whether a party has or has not per-
formed his agreement.
Summers, supra note 89, at 233; see also Burton, supra note 79, at 371 ("[E]xpress
contract terms alone are insufficient to determine a party's good faith in perfor-
mance."); id. at 380 n.44 (recognizing that "express language ... will fail to set
forth all of the specific undertakings of the parties").
213. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 86, § 570(A) (Supp. 1998) (arguing that the duty of
good faith directs an interpreter to be sensitive to the "spirit of the bargain" over
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tangible expectations that coalesce around the formation of their
relationship. 14
Indeed, on this point (like few others) one finds a noteworthy
harmony in the case law and literature. Among commentators215
and the courts2 16 alike there is now substantial agreement that
"the technicalities of the language"); Summers, supra note 9, at 827 ("[Ilt is one
function of the good-faith performance doctrine to enforce the spirit of deals, includ-
ing their unspecified inner logic."). Courts also have recognized this function of good
faith. See Hoffiman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987) (de-
scribing the duty of good faith as "the obligation to preserve the spirit of the bar-
gain rather than the form"); Fisher v. Toombs County Nursing Home, 479 S.E.2d
180, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("'Good faith' is a shorthand way of saying substantial
compliance with the spirit, and not merely the letter, of a contract."); Hilton Hotels
Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prods, Inc., 808 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Nev. 1991) (holding that a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing occurs when "one party to the con-
tract deliberately countervenes the intention and spirit of the contract").
214. Discussion of the duty of good faith is entirely inapt in the context of the
parol evidence rule, whatever its particular manifestation; that rule merely targets
prior or contemporaneous "agreements" between the parties. See U.C.C. § 2-202; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 213 (1981); cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 102,
at 83 (arguing that even a perfectly worded merger clause "would not keep out
evidence . . . introduced to impose rights and duties [on the parties] that arise by
operation of law"). Nor would it seem appropriate to consider good faith as an im-
plied "term" at all, for the definition of that concept merely returns the analysis to
the parties' "agreement." See U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (defining a "term" merely as "that
portion of an agreement which relates to a particular matter").
215. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 52-57 (focusing even more directly
on the parties' "justified expectations"); Burton, supra note 79, at 389-91 (describing
the "foregone opportunities" approach in light of the reasonable expectations at the
time of performance); Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 669 (arguing that good faith
"require[s] cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that another party
will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations"); Overby, supra note 125, at 978
(asserting that "[a] consensus may be drawn that the obligation of good faith serves
to protect the 'reasonable expectations of the parties'" (citation omitted)). Although
adhering to the view that the concept of good faith is incapable of precise articu-
lation, Professor Summers also has recognized that "[iun most cases the party acting
in bad faith frustrates the justified expectations of another." Summers, supra note
89, at 263. But see Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 593-94 (arguing that a rea-
sonable expectations approach fails to provide courts with sufficient guidance on the
application of the duty of good faith).
216. Recent years, in particular, have witnessed a strong and growing consensus in
the courts that the duty of good faith is directed at the protection of justified or
reasonable expectations. See, e.g., McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876, 881-
82 (10th Cir. 1997); MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff, 995 F.
Supp. 929, 932-33 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ruffalo v. CUC Int'l, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 430, 435
(D. Conn. 1997); Riddell Sports, Inc. v. Brooks, No. 92 Civ. 7851 (JGK), 1997 WL
148818, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1997); Fusion, Inc. v. Nebraska Aluminum Cast-
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the doctrine of good faith performance protects the "reasonable"
or "justified" expectations of the contracting parties.217 Similarly,
the Second Restatement, though adhering in principle to Profes-
sor Summers's "excluder analysis," emphasizes such notions in
its description of the duty of good faith.218 A recent Commentary
by the Code's Permanent Editorial Board likewise concluded
that the protection of reasonable expectations lies at the founda-
tion of the Code's conceptualization of good faith.219
The duty of good faith performance applies, of course, against
the background of the parties' formal agreement. That is, the ex-
press terms of the parties' agreement remain a prime source for
creating (and limiting) their expectations as to future perfor-
mance. 220 Some commentators have sought to ease the tension
here by emphasizing, at least within the scope of the Code, the
breadth of the notion of "agreement." 21 Under this view, the
ings, Inc., No. 95-2366-JWL, 1997 WL 51227, at *17 (D. Kan. Jan. 23, 1997);
Infomax Office Sys., Inc. v. MBO Binder & Co. of Am., 976 F. Supp. 1247, 1251
(S.D. Iowa 1997); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 499 (Colo. 1995) (en banc);
Kirkwood Kin Corp. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 94C-03-189-WTQ, 1997 WL 529587,
at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1997); Citicorp Savings v. Rucker, 692 N.E.2d 1319,
1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). For a list of earlier cases holding to the same effect, see
BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 54 n.39; Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at
594 n.2.
217. Another common judicial formulation is that the duty of good faith prohibits
conduct that would deprive a party of the "fruits" or "benefits" of the contract. See,
e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396,
1403 (11th Cir. 1998); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Passaic County Utils. Auth., 62 F.3d
582, 587 (3d Cir. 1995); Public Serv. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 53 F.3d 1090,
1097 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 597-98, nn. 53-54
(citing further cases). This approach does not differ appreciably from the "reasonable
expectations" view, and in fact is often cited merely as another formulation of the
same standard. See, e.g., Premier Technical Sales, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., No.
96-21054 SW, 1998 WL 296732, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 1998); Sons of Thunder,
Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 589 (N.J. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber,
949 P.2d 792, 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
218. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (observing that under the Second
Restatement good faith "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party").
219. See PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15 (concluding that "as expressed in
the Code, [good faith] serves as a directive to protect the reasonable expectations of
the contracting parties").
220. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
express terms under both the UCC and the Second Restatement).
221. See PEB COMMENTARYNO. 10, supra note 15; PATrERSON, supra note 50, at 20-30;
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flexible definition of agreement embraces the duty of good faith
as part of the broader examination of the parties' "bargain in
fact."2  Such reasoning has led the Code's Permanent Editorial
Board, for instance, to conclude-without an apparent intent to
dilute the force of good faith-that there is a direct link between
the content of the parties' agreement and that of the duty of
good faith.m
Properly understood, this observation is not inaccurate. 21 It
nonetheless unnecessarily creates the impression that content of
the duty of good faith is derived solely from, and thus in every
case is limited by, an interpretation of the formal "bargain"
between the parties. In doing so, this approach may invite the
precise kind of formalist manipulation of the duty of good faith
reflected in the textualist approach to the doctrine. Indeed, the
common refrain of the new textualists is that an express term in
a contract reflects the totality of the parties' "agreement" on the
subject, and thus by definition renders any contrary expectation
of the dependent party "unreasonable."2 5
Constructing the determinative expectations solely on the
foundation of the parties' formal "agreement" thus may distort
the analysis of the duty of good faith before it begins. 2 6 The
Patterson, supra note 15, at 523-24.
222. See PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15; Patterson, supra note 15, at 523-
24.
223. See PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15 ("[Ilt is important to recognize
that one acts in good faith relative to the agreement of the parties. To decide the
question whether a party has acted in good faith, a court must first ascertain the
substance of the parties' agreement."); see also Patterson, supra note 15, at 523
(providing the source from which this observation of the PEB is derived).
224. The Commentary elsewhere suggests that good faith has a "conceptual content"
that merely is "related to that of agreement." See PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra
note 15, at 2 (emphasis added).
225. See Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
("The implied covenant of good faith should not be invoked to override the express
terms of the agreement between the parties." (emphasis added)); James v. Whirlpool
Corp., 806 F. Supp. 835, 844 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (explaining that the implied duty did
not "override express terms of the agreement" between the parties (emphasis added));
supra notes 151-69.
226. See Burton, supra note 79, at 5 ("he content [of good faith] should be deter-
mined with reference to the agreement of the parties. However, the obligation could
be deleted from the [Code] without material effect if this were all that good faith
performance meant.").
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analysis would begin on a sounder footing if it considered con-
tractual expectations in all their complexity. Like most social
facts, such expectations can appear in a broad continuum of
generality and specificity. Some may indeed be "agreement-
like"--well-formed and consciously shared by the parties.27
Similarly, some may arise under the influence of less tangible,
yet still well-recognized implied sources such as usages of
trade.228
The important message here is that these forms of expectation
are illustrations not limitations. Indeed, the duty of good faith
will have its most significant impact-in the case of discretion-
ary contractual powers in particular 229 -when the expectations
that arise from experience, relationship, and context have not
been distilled into fixed, shared understandings between the
parties. A party thus can have protected expectations in absence
of a conforming common practice in the relevant trade230 or even
of a formal "sequence of previous conduct"2 "' with her trading
partner.3 2 Nor should the duty of good faith require for its oper-
227. In fact, the overlay of good faith may add little to the analysis in this context,
for the standard rules of contract interpretation will protect the shared expectations
of the parties independent of the duty of good faith. Admittedly, the line between
the shared expectations that are enforceable under standard rules of contract inter-
pretation and those protected by good faith may be a blurry one. See W. David
Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by
Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984) (providing a comprehensive argument
that the "new meaning" in contract law broadly gives effect to "reasonable expecta-
tions"); see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 17 (1981) (argu-
ing that the Code's conception of bargain includes even those "reasonable expecta-
tions" that are not fully formed at the time of contract formation); Barry Reiter &
John Swan, Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, in STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 1, 11 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980) (arguing that the
protection of reasonable expectations is evident throughout contract law).
228. See U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (1995) (noting that the obligation of good faith merely
is "further implemented" by usages of trade and its conceptual relatives).
229. For more on the significance of discretionary powers, see infra notes 244-63
and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the Code's definition of a
usage of trade in section 1-205(2)).
231. U.C.C. § 1-205(1); see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the
Code's definition of a course of dealing in section 1-205(1)).
232. See Summers, supra note 89, at 199 (stating that a court may rely on good
faith "to enforce the unspecified 'inner logic' of a deal when custom and usage are
1999] TEXTUALISM, PARTY AUTONOMY, AND GOOD FAITH 1279
ation that both parties "agree" on, or even have actual knowl-
edge of, the expectations of the other.
At this level, in other words, we depart the realm of interpre-
tation in the narrow sense of divining "meaning" from contrac-
tual text and enter under the influence of the "reasonableness"
or "justifiability" of party expectations.2  That is, beyond even
the standard rule of interpretation according to shared expecta-
tions, the duty of good faith may well protect unilaterally-held
expectations that arise in the contracting process.2 4 Indeed, as
the parties' willingness and ability to contemplate future events
in concrete terms wears thin, the doctrine of good faith supplies
what might be seen as a "presumed expectation." That "expecta-
tion" is the minimum standard of reasonableness and fair deal-
ing in the relevant community in which the parties' contractual
obligations arose and are to be performed.23 5
silent and when the true basis for implying a promise is that good faith requires as
much"); see also Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 677 (arguing that the Code's defini-
tion of good faith applicable to merchants-which now applies with a much broader
scope under the Code, see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text-"requires only
a showing of 'reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,' which is presumably
something less than proof of a course of dealing or usage of the trade").
233. Indeed, the very concept of "discretion" in performance is that the parties have
not given a final "meaning" to the express terms that define their relationship at
the formation stage. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1995) (en
banc) (observing with regard to the duty of good faith performance that the "reason-
able expectations doctrine often 'fails to give effect to some hornbook rules governing
the construction of contracts,' including 'the precept that contracts which are free
from ambiguity are to be enforced as written" (quoting Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712
P.2d 985, 990 & n.7 (Colo. 1986))). See also infra notes 255-62 and accompanying
text.
234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt. a (1981) (noting that good
faith emphasizes faithfulness to the justified expectations "of the other party"). Al-
though good faith permits a focus on the expectations of even one of the parties, the
standard is an objective one for that party's expectations. Thus, unreasonable subjec-
tively held expectations will not find protection under the duty of good faith.
235. One might reformulate aspects of Professor Summers's "excluder analysis" to
accommodate this point. Although he may not embrace a comprehensive use of "ex-
pectation" terminology, Professor Summers recognized that one of the essential func-
tions of the duty of good faith is to supply a minimum standard of fair dealing in
contractual relationships. See Summers, supra note 9, at 812; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt. a (describing good faith in light of "community
standards" of fairness and reasonableness); HILMAN ET AL., supra note 99, 6.03[21
(arguing that "[tihe underlying basis" for a decision concerning the duty of good
faith "is often determined on fundamental notions of fairness").
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Consider as an illustration the case of Best v. United States
National Bank.3 6 In that case, bank depositors alleged a breach
of the duty of good faith in the bank's post-formation adjustment
of the service charge for checks drawn against insufficient
funds.23' The significant aspect of the Oregon Supreme Court's
opinion was its recognition that the duty of good faith can derive
independent force from both extant community standards of
fairness and the parties' more concrete expectations that arise in
the formation of their relationship. 38 Thus, although the court
noted that commercial parties ordinarily can expect performance
in a "commercially reasonable" manner, it found that "the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties need not be so limited."23 9 In
the process, the court also properly focused the analysis on the
reasonable expectations of the depositors as to the bank's exer-
cise of its contractual discretion. 21° It ultimately affirmed a deni-
al of the bank's motion for summary judgment, even though the
parties' contract defined no limitation on the bank's discretion in
setting insufficient fund fees.241
The essential point here is that the expectations that are pro-
tected by the duty of good faith are not necessarily constructed
by a formal process of "agreement" between the parties. To be
236. 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987).
237. See id. at 556-57.
238. See id. at 557-58.
239. Id. at 558. In a more problematic passage, the court also opined that in some
cases external standards of fairness may operate to discipline extreme abuses of a
discretionary power even apart from the reasonable expectations of the other party.
See id. at 559 ("When a party has the contractual right to specify a price term, the
term specified may be so high or low that the party will be deemed to have acted
in bad faith regardless of the reasonable expectations of the other party.").
240. See id. at 558-60; see also Malack Prods., Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.,
52 F.3d 373, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (focusing on allegations regarding the plaintiffs
reasonable expectations in denying a motion to dismiss a breach of duty of good
faith claim).
241. See Best, 739 P.2d at 557 (affirming the denial of the motion for summary
judgment even though "Inlothing in the depositors' account agreement with the Bank
expressly limited the Bank's authority to set [nonsufficient fund] fees"). Unfortunate-
ly, in subsequent years the Oregon Supreme Court apparently also has fallen under
the influence of the new textualism in contract. For a critical review of this appar-
ent trend, see Webster, supra note 20, at 541-48 (discussing, in particular, Uptown
Heights Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Seafirst Corp., 891 P.2d 639 (Or. 1995), and
Tolbert v. First Natl Bank, 823 P.2d 965 (Or. 1991)).
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sure, the express agreement of the parties will influence the rea-
sonableness of specific expectations, a point addressed in greater
detail below. 2 Contrary to the animating philosophy of the new
textualism, however, the face of that express agreement alone
cannot determine the full force of the protected expectations.
The core function of the duty of good faith, rather, is to permit
the parties to have legally cognizable expectations (if "reason-
able" under the circumstances) that do not necessarily find ex-
pression in the parties' formal agreement.m
B. Examining the Factual and Normative Premises of
Textualism
1. Discretion and "Hidden Gaps" in Contracts
The second major misapprehension of the new textualist ap-
proach to the duty of good faith lies in its assumptions about the
context in which discretionary rights arise. Recall that the com-
mon premise on this score is that every express contractual pow-
er is absolute.' 4 That is, consonant with their fixation on ex-
press terms, the new textualists credit a failure to incorporate
an express limitation on discretion as an "agreement" between
the parties that no such limitation exists.245 Because the duty of
good faith does not create an independent obligation of fairness
or altruism, they reason, the law provides no conceptual tools for
judicial "second-guessing" of the "privileges expressly reserved"
in the parties' writing.'
The textualist approach to the duty of good faith also founders
on the frailty of this factual foundation. In particular, the new
242. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
243. This is not to say that the duty of good faith creates free-floating obligations
that are separate from the parties' actual contractual relationship. See U.C.C. § 1-
203 cmt. (noting that the duty of good faith "does not create a separate duty of
fairness and reasonableness which can be independently breached") (added by PEB
COhmENTARY No. 10, supra note 15). It merely means that, contrary to the pre-
sumption of textualism, the expectations as to the exercise of contractual discretion
cannot be divined solely from a review of the express terms of a contract.
244. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
246. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing the
textualist conception of discretion).
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textualist view entirely disregards the now well-accepted fact
that there are significant limitations in any negotiation and
drafting process. 247 The imprecision of language itself precludes
the parties from reducing even complete, determinate under-
standings into words that are unambiguous to independent in-
terpreters.248 Moreover, as other scholars have amply demon-
strated, necessary information for accurate decisionmaking may
be dispersed too greatly or not available to the parties at all.249
Limitations on human rationality itself250 will also constrain the
ability of transactors to contemplate future events, and thus to
provide for all relevant contingencies in their express agree-
ment.25' Even if theoretically possible, it simply is impractical or
247. Indeed, much of the voluminous literature on identifying the appropriate de-
fault rules for incomplete contracts is founded on this notion. For an introduction
into this literature, see Ayers & Gertner, supra note 13, at 92 n.29 (discussing the
ways in which contracts are incomplete); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1819-20 (1991)
(concluding that "[als a practical matter ... most contracts are quite incomplete").
For a comprehensive analysis of the subject of incomplete contracts, see Symposium,
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993).
248. This of course is one of the core tenets of the realist criticism of the interpre-
tive rules of classical formalism. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text; see
also David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 462 (1990) ("[Gliven the inherent imprecision of even highly technical legal
language, it is impossible for transactors to craft language so precisely that it is
certain to cover the exact scope of the contingency intended to be covered .... ");
Goetz & Scott, supra note 49, at 265-73 (examining the impediments to accurate sig-
naling of the parties' actual agreement); Murray, supra note 35, at 1344 ("The par-
ties may attempt to state their agreement in clear and unambiguous words; but try
as they may they will fail, for scarcely any word is capable of denoting one
thought.").
249. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 831-35 (1992) (discussing the "[1]imited [a]ccessibility of
[plersonal and [1]ocal [k]nowledge"); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and
the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 389, 393-96 (1993) (analyzing
the substantial informational barriers to full negotiation).
250. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Zamir, supra note 135, at 1793-95 (observ-
ing that "many studies demonstrate the limited cognitive capabilities of people" and
citing extensive literature on the subject). See also Robert E. Scott, Error and Ratio-
nality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive
Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (1986) (discussing
the effect of limited rationality on decisionmaking).
251. Allan Farnsworth aptly has described this phenomenon in terms of the "limited
attention" of transactors. See Farnsworth, Omission, supra note 29, at 868-71 (ar-
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too costly for them to negotiate over every potentially relevant
detail.252
These limitations on the agreement process may apply, signifi-
cantly, even where the parties' writing grants to one party an
otherwise unrestricted discretionary power. Even if the parties
recognize the breadth of such a power, it simply may be imprac-
tical or too costly to negotiate over all of the implications covered
by the general language. Similarly, the parties may altogether
fail to foresee the implications from the use of a general term,
even for the circumstances known at the time of a drafting.253
Finally, and perhaps most significantly in the present context,
one or both of the parties may refrain from raising issues that
might call into question the good faith of the other, for fear of
appearing untrustworthy or litigious themselves. 54
guing that this limited attention precludes transactors from forming expectations as
to all possible future contingencies, and from reducing even all of their actual expec-
tations into formal contract language in any event).
252. Even a brief list of such practical impediments to full negotiation would in-
clude the following- increased expenses and inconvenience of investigating the back-
ground of the other party, time and personnel costs of negotiation, drafting costs of
distilling all details into contract language, legal fees for resolving unclear issues of
law, costs of researching and assessing all potential contingencies (both their magni-
tude and the likelihood of their occurrence), and monitoring and verification costs.
See also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 92-93 (describing the various
transaction costs that give rise to contractual incompleteness); Charny, supra note
247, at 1819 ("In almost all transactions, it would be extremely costly to draft a
contract that purported explicitly to address the obligations of the parties for all
conceivable future contingencies.").
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 cmt. e (1981) ("People commonly
use general language without a clear consciousness of its full scope and without
awareness that an exception should be made."). Other scholars also have recognized
the phenomenon of "gaps" even in express contractual terms. See Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 13, at 92 n.29 (observing that gaps can arise even when the "parties'
duties are fully specified" if "those specified duties are not tailored to economically
relevant future events"); Farnsworth, Omission, supra note 29, at 875, n.86 (describ-
ing this problem as an "overstatement" of the parties' shared expectation); Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements
and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272 (1992) (arguing that gaps can
exist where the parties define their respective obligations "too coarsely").
254. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertuer, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 765 (1992) (arguing that where
general terms are once proposed, the parties "may be reluctant to suggest alterna-
tive provisions ... because to do so might indicate that the individual is more liti-
gious or more rigidly deontological, and thus more costly to deal with"); Farnsworth,
Omission, supra note 29, at 872 (suggesting that parties may prefer not to reduce
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In any case, what may well remain even with otherwise un-
qualified language in a writing is what might be termed a "hid-
den gap" in the parties' contract.255 The gap here, to be sure,
does not appear on the face of the contract's terms; what emerg-
es on detailed inspection, rather, is a gap in the parties' actual
shared understandings. The risk of such gaps in understanding
will only increase with the complexity of the specific contractual
relationship as well as under the corrosive effect of the passage
of time.5 6
These observations take on particular significance when one
party is granted a discretionary power to control an aspect of the
parties' relationship after formation. Indeed, the very circum-
stances that preclude precise articulation of the parties' agree-
ment on an issue suggest that a good faith limitation is a neces-
sary companion of contractual discretion.257 One recent court's
distillation of this thought is worthy of quotation:
expectations to express terms in order to avoid unnecessary delay or a frustration of
the proposed deal); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (observing
with regard to omissions in contracts that the parties may fail to manifest an expec-
tation "because discussion of it might be unpleasant or might produce delay or im-
passe").
255. For a similar analysis of the "hidden gaps" in a treaty or statute, see Van
Alstine, supra note 3, at 768-75.
256. The particular case of long-term contracts has provoked a spirited debate in
the literature. Compare Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Con-
tracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (arguing in favor
of judicial adjustment of long-term contractual relationships under certain circum-
stances), and Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term
Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981) (same), with Clayton P. Gillette,
Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 521 (1985) (disagreeing with Professor Speidel). See generally Macneil, Adjust-
ment, supra note 116, at 854 (examining judicial adjustment of long-term contracts
under the various prominent approaches to the issue); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987) (analyzing the
decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-term commercial contracts).
257. See B.J. Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 727 (1983).
Mr. Reiter argues that:
[Good faith] reminds us of the incompleteness of written or even oral re-
cords of contracts. The limits of human foresight, the costs and threat to
solidarity of increased specificity, and the insurmountable barrier to com-
plete communication attributable to our individuality ensure that no re-
cord of a contract can be complete and identically understood by all.
Id. The emphasis on the role of good faith in limiting discretionary powers is one of
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The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing particu-
laxly comes into play in those circumstances where the par-
ties to the contract realize detailed provisions on performance
would be ineffectual, frustrating, or impractical. The parties
are then forced to confer control of a contract term... upon
one another, leaving each to depend on the good faith of the
other.s
Every contractual right admits, of course, of some form of
discretion for its beneficiary. Even a fixed price term, for in-
stance, permits the buyer the "discretion" not to insist on strict
enforcement, or to acquiesce expressly in requested adjust-
ments." 9 This, however, is a discretion of a different nature. In
that case, the parties have defined an obligation (a set amount
of U.S. Dollars, for example) whose content is determinable by a
fixed standard external to their control. Such an obligational
term can take effect (and be enforced judicially), therefore, with-
out the exercise of discretion by either party.6 0 In this situation,
the key contributions of Professor Steven Burton. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra
note 71, at 45-51 (discussing "discretion in performance"); Burton, supra note 79, at
372-73 (discussing the importance of contractual discretion for good faith analysis);
Burton, Reply, supra note 89, at 501-03 (elaborating on the notion of "discretion in
performance"); supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
258. Pizza Management, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1154, 1178 (D. Kan.
1990).
259. Commercial parties, in fact, commonly accede to such requests for a variety of
nonlegal reasons, chief among them reputational concerns and the interests of amica-
ble relations in the future. See Charny, supra note 248, at 392-97 (analyzing the
various nonlegal incentives for cooperation such as reputational and relational con-
cerns); Gillette, supra note 256, at 556-59 ("Commercial actors do tend to work out
difficulties that result from disruptive events, to renegotiate previously struck bar-
gains, and to resolve disputes amicably without resort to legal process."); James J.
White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth
Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBuRN L.J. 1, 6-10 (1982) (discussing the same phe-
nomenon).
260. A similar point can be made about contractual clauses that take effect auto-
matically upon the occurrence of some external event and thus do not depend for
their application on an affirmative exercise of discretion by either of the parties. The
duty of good faith performance may not apply, for example, when a contract termi-
nates on the basis of an event external to the control of the parties (often, the mere
passage of time) and without an exercise of discretion by either of them. See, e.g.,
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n., 110 F.3d 318,
331 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding no breach of good faith when contract terminated auto-
matically upon a third party's petition for appointment of a trustee over the
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the duty of good faith does not operate, as the new textualists
seem to fear, as a universal solvent capable of dissolving the
express "agreements" of the parties.61
Matters are different, however, when a contractual provision
permits an exercise of discretion by one party in the first in-
stance. In contrast to our fixed price term, a clause granting, for
example, a right to determine the timing of performance, or a
power to terminate a contract or to consent to assignment, be-
comes relevant only through a party's affirmative exercise of dis-
cretion. Here, the very content of the parties' obligations re-
mains indeterminate at the time of formation, for one of them
retains a power to control that aspect of their relationship
through unilateral action. The very existence of post-formation
discretion means that the parties' express agreement lacks a
fixed standard that is external to their control. At some unde-
fined level, therefore, the value of the contractual relationship to
one of the parties remains subject to the will of the other.
This lack of a defined external standard to govern the discre-
tion gives rise with particular force to the concerns discussed
above about an absence of agreement between the parties. To
say that the content of the contract is subject to one party's
discretion, in other words, tells us little about the parties' actual
expectations concerning the exercise of that discretion. 6 '
plaintiffs assets); Elliott & Frantz, Inc. v. Svedala Indus., Inc., No. CIVJA. 97-3804,
1997 WL 799449, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (finding that good faith did not
apply to an automatic termination provision); Farris v. Hutchinson, 838 P.2d 374,
376-77 (Mont. 1992) (same). Even in this situation, however, a duty of good faith in
the enforcement of the contract may well apply. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note
71, at 306-11. Moreover, the required examination of contextual evidence may reveal,
for example, a prior course of dealing to the effect that the parties' relationship was
a continuing one subject to a "discretionary" right of termination. For a comprehen-
sive analysis of the issues surrounding the termination of contractual relationships,
see Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 617 (1983).
261. Other contract doctrines, most notably unconscionability, may apply in such a
case, however. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995). See also infra notes 353-55 and ac-
companying text.
262. Cf. Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.)
(noting that even in administrative law an agency's expressly conferred powers are
subject to an "abuse of discretion" standard).
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The new textualist approach to good faith thus founders on
this essential point as well. The observation that one of the
parties has "reserved a privilege" to take a certain action merely
begs the question of what standards (if any) should govern the
exercise of such discretion. The parties may well have agreed
that the discretionary power was to be absolute and unrestrict-
ed; indeed, in some circumstances it may be in the best interest
of both parties to do so.26 To say that this follows from the mere
fact of discretion, however, is to begin the analysis with its own
conclusion.
2. Exposing Textualism's Flawed Normative Foundation
Stripped of its factual assumptions, the new textualism in
contract merely offers a normative conclusion about the bargain-
ing process: Where a contract grants to a party an express dis-
cretionary power, the burden should fall to the other party to
negotiate an express limitation.
Like so much of the new textualist approach, this notion trac-
es its lineage to classical formalism. 214 It thus should not be sur-
prising that the new textualist case law finds its animating
tenet on this score in an opinion from 1933: "[In commercial
transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek
strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect them-
selves.2 65 Under this view, in short, the limitations on discretion
263. Cf. Charny, supra note 248, at 458 (arguing against an overly broad interpre-
tation of the duty of good faith because borrowers may "rationally want to delegate
discretion to the bank - for example, to signal their superior reliability or to induce
the bank to accept arrangements that are riskier in other respects"); Fischel, supra
note 125, at 142 (arguing in the lender-creditor context that a grant of discretion to
the lender in extending and terminating financing is "best understood as [a] bonding
mechanism used by the borrower to obtain more favorable credit terms").
264. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of
classical formalism that every right or obligation was absolute in absence of an
express limitation or qualification).
265. Taylor Equip. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933)); see also Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (same);
Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., No. 94 C 6601, 1995 WL 348049,
at *4 (N.D. IM. June 6, 1995) (quoting the same language with approval); National
Educ. Corp. v. Martin, No. 93 C 6247, 1994 WL 317733, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 22,
1994) (same). A particularly blunt statement of this approach is found in Rothe v.
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that lie at the core of good faith only apply if the dependent
party bargains for their express inclusion. 266 This Part demon-
strates that, even at this normative core, the new textualism in
contract misapprehends the effect of the duty of good faith per-
formance on the burden of expression in the law of contracts.
There is an important subtlety in the nature of the doctrine of
good faith as a duty imposed on the parties by the force of law.
Recall that UCC section 1-102(3), for example, forbids a broad
disclaimer of that duty, but permits the parties to define the
"standards" against which their conduct is to be measured.6 7
Surprisingly little case law exists on the interplay between these
two principles. Close examination nonetheless reveals an im-
portant message for the new textualist approach to the duty of
good faith. That message is a reversal of the classical pre-
sumptions about the burden of expression269 in the contracting
process.
This conclusion emerges even from a simple structural view of
the Code provisions governing the interaction of party autonomy
Revco D.S., Inc., 976 F. Supp. 784, 794-95 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding with regard to a
lessee's right to cease operations under a lease that "bad faith only becomes an
issue if a good faith clause was in the lease"), affd, 148 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1998).
266. See Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 767 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir. 1985).
267. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("[Tlhe obligationl of good faith ... prescribed by this
Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement deter-
mine the standards by which the performance of such obligationl is to be mea-
sured ... ."); supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text; cf U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2
(observing that the section "recognizes the prevailing practice of having agreements
set forth standards by which due diligence is measured and explicitly provides that,
in the absence of a showing that the standards manifestly are unreasonable, the
agreement controls"). The section also provides that such standards are not enforce-
able if they are "manifestly unreasonable." See infra note 354 and accompanying
text.
268. Section 1-102(3) addresses not only good faith, but also the duties of "care,"
"diligence," and "reasonableness" imposed by the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3). Al-
though a number of cases have cited the provision, none has offered an analysis of
the interaction of the principle of nondisclaimability with the power of the parties to
set "standards" for good faith. The only case worthy of note in this regard is
Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 139 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979)
(suggesting that a clause permitting termination without cause could be a standard
in the sense of § 1-102(3)).
269. The term "burden of expression" derives from Allan Farnsworth. See E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 548 (2d ed. 1990); see also Farnsworth, Omission, supra note
29, at 884-87 (discussing "burden of expression").
19991 TEXTUALISM, PARTY AUTONOMY, AND GOOD FAITH 1289
with good faith. We have seen above that the duty of good faith
performance is "imposed" on the parties by force of UCC section
1-203, and thus without the need for any affirmative action on
their part.270 When considered carefully, then, a good faith limi-
tation on the exercise of discretionary powers inheres from the
very inception of the contractual relationship.271 With this foun-
dation, UCC section 1-102(3) only permits the parties to define
by affirmative agreement the contours of those good faith obliga-
tions in specific contexts. 2 The short of the matter is that the
law begins with a presumption of good faith limitations on dis-
cretionary rights; it admits of a deviation from such limitations
only upon afIrmative proof of a corresponding agreement be-
tween the parties.
Although less clearly articulated in the case law, the result
under the common law of contracts should be no different. The
presumption of a good faith limitation on discretionary powers
follows from the established prudential notion that law will not
easily assume that one party has put itself at the mercy of an-
other. Building on this foundation, the common law of con-
270. See supra notes 10-13, 75-77 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
272. Indeed, the notion of a good faith limitation on discretionary rights pervades
the Code. When a contract grants one party a power to set the price, quantity, tim-
ing, or other aspects of performance after formation, the Code subjects the exercise
of that discretion to a duty of good faith. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (stating that
unilateral power to define price is subject to duty of good faith); id. § 2-306(1) (same
as to quantity); § 2-309(1) (same as to time of performance); id. § 2-306(1) (same as
to quantity); id. § 2-311(1) (same as to other particulars of performance). For a more
detailed analysis of these provisions of the Code, see Burton, supra note 86, at 6-13.
The same applies even to otherwise-unrestricted discretionary powers to accelerate
the performance obligations of the other party. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (subjecting rights
of acceleration "at will" to (subjective) good faith); id. § 2A-109 (subjecting rights of
acceleration of lease obligations "at will" to (objective) good faith).
273. This precept traces its lineage to the early exposition of a duty of "best ef-
forts" when a contract grants one party apparent discretion in deciding whether to
perform under an exclusive dealing arrangement. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone
Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding on this basis that a rea-
sonableness standard applied even to an express clause providing that one party's
"decision in matters relating to artistic effect shall be final"); Popkin v. National
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 1194, 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the im-
position of good faith and "reasonable efforts" obligations in an agency contract fol-
lowed from the premise that "[wie are not to suppose that one party was to be
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tracts, like the Code, "imposes" a duty of good faith by force of
law.274 Here, too, the law thus properly begins with a presump-
tion of good faith limitations on discretionary powers, and with-
out requiring an affirming intention of the parties.275
The essential message that emerges is that the duty of good
faith performance reverses the classical notions of the burden of
expression on which the new textualism is based. The law pre-
sumes a duty of good faith in the exercise of discretionary pow-
ers; it therefore relieves the dependent party of any obligation to
"protect herself" through negotiation of a corresponding express
limitation on that discretion (though she remains free, of course,
to bargain for greater protection).2 6 To such extent, therefore,
one might conceive of the doctrine of good faith as imposing on
the party with discretion the obligation to "purchase egotism,"
and, derivatively, as freeing the other party from a duty to "pur-
chase cooperation."2 7
placed at the mercy of the other") (quoting Wood, 118 N.E. at 214)); Iowa Fuel &
Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 1991) ("[A]
contract will not be interpreted giving discretion to one party in a manner which
would put one party at the mercy of another, unless the contract clearly requires
such an interpretation." (emphasis added)); supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text
(discussing Wood).
274. See supra notes 79, 86 and accompanying text.
275. It is important to note the difference between the duty of good faith perfor-
mance and that of good faith enforcement in this regard. See BURTON & ANDERSEN,
supra note 71, at 291-92 (arguing with regard to the occurrence of an event that is
beyond a party's control in the first place that "[o]nce it is established that the
event triggering an enforcement right has occurred, the party invoking an apparent
enforcement term should be entitled to prevail unless the opponent can prove the
absence of good faith"). The important contrast here is between enforcement of rights
that arise in this fashion and an exercise of a discretionary power permitted or
contemplated by the parties' contract with regard to performance in the first in-
stance.
276. See id. at 47 (arguing that "contractual discretion is presumptively bridled by
the law of contracts-by the covenant of good faith implied in every contract").
277. The "to such extent" limitation, of course, is an important one. Although the
duty of good faith performance places limits on discretionary powers, it does not
sanction judicial adjustment of fixed contractual obligations not subject to the post-
formation control of either party. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. For
an analysis of the tension between "egotism" and "cooperation" in selecting general
default rules in contracts, see Gillette, supra note 116, at 552-62 (concluding that
the particular facts of each contractual relationship will preclude distillation of a
general background norm in favor of either extreme). While Professor Gillette's ob-
servations may be true as a general proposition, the duty of good faith performance
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Viewed in this light, the doctrine of good faith is more than a
simple "residual gap-filling default rule of contract law." 78
Rather, the doctrine also operates in the foreground of the par-
ties' relationship in the nature of a legal presumption:279 any
post-formation discretionary power to affect the parties' relative
jural positions is subject to the external obligations imposed by
good faith and fair dealing, unless the party seeking such discre-
tion herself achieves an agreed limitation on such obligations in
a sufficiently explicit and prominent manner.
To be sure, the burden to establish an actual breach of the
duty of good faith-an exercise of discretion contrary to protect-
ed expectations-in a particular factual circumstance will re-
main with the dependent party.280 The simple existence of a
discretionary power, even one that is subject to no restriction on
its face, however, does not render all such expectations irrele-
vant based on a normative duty to bargain for such express
"good faith" obligations in the first instance.28 ' Rather, the bur-
den of expression to effect a displacement of the duty of good
faith will fall to the party seeking discretion, a point addressed
supplies the limiting norm in the specific case of a discretionary contractual power,
at least in absence of proof of an explicit, affirmative agreement to the contrary. See
infra notes 282-325 and accompanying text (analyzing the necessary conditions for
bargaining around the duty of good faith); cf Steven J. Burton, Default Principles,
Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 115, 159-65
(1993) (arguing for a general background norm of cooperation for gaps in contracts);
Gillette, supra note 116, at 581 (suggesting "that cooperation may have some special
appeal in the realm of remote events"). But see Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at
594 n.41 (citing Gillette and arguing, incorrectly in my view, that such reasoning
renders any analysis of reasonable expectations in the context of the duty of good
faith performance inherently misguided).
278. Infomax Office Sys., Inc. v. MBO Binder & Co. of Am., 976 F. Supp. 1247,
1251 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (quoting Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 586).
279. In this sense, the "nondisclaimable" doctrine of good faith functions similar to
what Richard Craswell has referred to as "agreement rules." See Craswell, supra
note 125, at 503-04. Such rules-for example, the rules of offer and acceptance, and
the doctrines of unconscionability and undue influence-define the conditions under
which contractors will be allowed to vary otherwise-applicable background rules. See
id. at 503-04, 514-15.
280. For a more detailed analysis of this point, see infra notes 322-24 and accom-
panying text.
281. See PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15, at 3 ("It is... wrong to con-
clude that as long as [an] agreement allows a party to do something, it is under all
terms and conditions permissible.").
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in more detail immediately below. Even at its normative founda-
tion, in short, the new textualism in contract misapprehends the
essential function of the duty of good faith performance in con-
tractual relations.
C. Good Faith, Party Autonomy, and the Burden of Expression
The analysis to this point has demonstrated the flaws in the
factual and normative assumptions of a textualist approach to
the duty of good faith performance. As we have seen, however,
the Code at some ill-defined level subjects the duty of good faith
to the force of party autonomy.282 The common law also flows in
the same direction.2" The question thus left unanswered is
whether (and if so how) transactors may ever grant to one (or
both) of them a specific discretionary power that is insulated
from the duty of good faith performance.2
There is persuasive force in the argument that informed par-
ties should be able to agree at the formation stage on a contrac-
tual power whose exercise is not subject to subsequent review
under external standards of "fair" and "reasonable" conduct.
282. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing UCC § 1-102(3)
(1995)).
283. See Flight Concepts Ltd. Partnership v. Boeing Co., 38 F.3d 1152, 1157 (10th
Cir. 1994) ("Although the doctrine [of good faith] is generally implied for all contract
provisions, it is irrelevant where the contract is drawn so as to leave a decision to
the 'uncontrolled discretion' of one of the parties."); Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v.
Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 728 (Cal. 1992) (concluding in a detailed
opinion-although littered with overstatements-that the duty of good faith "is plain-
ly subject to the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of the con-
tract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct which would otherwise
have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing' (quoting
VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 777-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1969)). Though flawed in its point of departure, this, of course, is the ultimate desti-
nation of the textualist approach to the duty of good faith. See supra notes 144-92
and accompanying text.
284. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 63-68 (arguing for a "[p]riority of
[e]xpress [tierms," but emphasizing the need for flexible interpretation of the parties'
actual agreement); Burton, supra note 79, at 371-72 n.14 (arguing that the parties
"are free to determine by agreement what good faith will permit or require of them"
and citing cases); Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 624-27 (arguing that the duty
of good faith can be waived through explicit language); see also Farnsworth, supra
note 15, at 678-79 (arguing for a restrictive construction of the nondisclaimability
language of UCC section 1-102(3)).
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This Part argues, however, that the burden of expression to
accomplish that end should be a substantial one, and should
include requirements not only of clarity, but also of effective
notice.
1. Negating Expectations: The Burden of Expression
One of the principal objectives of the doctrine of good faith
performance is to protect contracting parties from unfair
surprise.2"5 In its more concrete manifestation, this notion is
reflected in the growing consensus that the doctrine serves to
protect the "justified" (or "reasonable") expectations of the par-
ties that arise in the formation of their relationship.2"' As the
Code's sales provisions in particular recognize, this goal of pro-
tection against surprise takes on special significance when one
party is granted a discretionary power to control an aspect of
performance after formation.28 7 Such an approach, not surpris-
ingly, is also fully consonant with the philosophy expressed by
the Code's principal author, Karl Llewellyn, from the earliest
stages of the Code's creation.288
At its most elemental level, the duty of good faith performance
fulfils this function by protecting reasonable expectations as to
a future exercise of discretion without the need for a correspond-
285. See Robert Dugan, Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 39 (1980) (arguing that the prevention of surprise "rep-
resents the principal objective of the good faith obligation"); Patterson, supra note
48, at 200 ("Good faith means lack of surprise.").
286. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
287. See U.C.C. § 2-311 cmt. 1 (emphasizing that a party with a discretionary
power to specify the particulars of performance "is required to exercise good faith
and to act in accordance with commercial standards so that there is no surprise");
id. § 2-309 cmt. 3 (stating with regard to the timing of shipment or delivery that
"[t]he applicable principles ... make it clear that surprise is to be avoided"); id. §
2-608 cmt. 5 (stating with regard to a revocation of acceptance that the content of
the required notice "is to be determined in this case as in others by considerations
of good faith [and] prevention of surprise"); supra notes 229-43 and accompanying
text.
288. See Karl Llewellyn, Selected Comments to Uniform Revised Sales Act, General
Comment on Parts H and IV, reprinted in PATIERSON, supra note 50, app. 2 at 209-
32 (arguing that "good faith [and] avoidance of surprise are pervading principles of
[the] Act" (emphasis omitted)).
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ing agreement of the parties. 2 9 That is, when the content of a
contractual relationship remains subject to the post-formation
control of one of the parties, the doctrine of good faith operates
as a presumptive right of the other party not to be subject to a
surprise exercise of such discretion.290 Moreover, this protection
may not be dispensed with in its entirety; to do so would jeop-
ardize the very idea of pacta sunt servanda (the obligation to
keep one's agreements) on which enforceable contractual obliga-
tions principally depend.29 ' In the same vein, truly unlimited
discretion on an essential term (price, subject, timing)-even if
expressly, knowingly, and freely granted-would dissolve the
irreducible core of an enforceable contractual relationship. 292
Subject to these limitations, the right of protection against
unfair surprise (protection of a party's "reasonable expectations")
granted by the doctrine of good faith may be a proper subject of
negotiation. The presumptive nature of the duty of good faith
performance, however, imposes important qualifications in this
regard.
289. See supra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
291. See Burton, supra note 86, at 4; Summers, supra note 9, at 862; see also Bur-
ton, supra note 277, at 131 n.43 ("If a contract consists of commitments to keep
promises, a contract clause disclaiming any obligation to keep a promise would be a
contradiction in terms. It is mainly for this reason that the covenant of good faith
may not be disclaimed by agreement of the parties."); cf. Barnett, supra note 249, at
883 n.164 (arguing against the validity of any disclaimer of the duty of good faith
and observing that "[if any such expressed clause appeared in a writing, we would
strongly suspect either that it went unread or that some serious defect in the bar-
gaining process was responsible for its inclusion").
292. This of course is the point of the rules in the Code that subject discretionary
powers as to timing, quantity, or price to an obligation of good faith. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. §§ 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-309(1). In contrast, some common law courts continue
to view unfettered discretion on such an essential contractual term to be an unen-
forceable, "illusory" promise. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 269, at 75-78 (citing cases
but noting the growing tendency to view such contracts as enforceable in light of the
limitation imposed by the doctrine of good faith). Similarly, where an agreement
purports to grant one party unfettered discretion with regard to the satisfaction of a
condition precedent to performance, courts often find an implied good faith limitation
in order to avoid a conclusion that the agreement is "illusory." See, e.g., White Stone
Partners v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 978 F. Supp. 878, 881-82 (D. Minn. 1997); Horizon
Corp. v. Westcor, Inc., 688 P.2d 1021, 1025-28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (surveying the
case law on this issue).
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The first arises from the nature of the expectations protected
by the duty of good faith. By definition, any affirmative "agree-
ment"-at least one that is worth the trouble of negotiat-
ing-insulating a party's future exercise of a discretionary power
will seek to narrow the expectations of reasonableness that
would otherwise arise in the formation of the parties' relation-
ship.293 Indeed, the very premise of the duty of good faith perfor-
mance, as we have seen, is that such expectations are so funda-
mental (or obvious) that the parties rarely mention them in
negotiations, and almost never distill them through express dis-
cussion into fixed "contractual" understandings.294
This premise is a refined reflection of the traditional maxim
that the law should not assume that one party has put itself at
the mercy of another.295 Properly understood, the modern doc-
trine of good faith fulfills a similar function: It operates as a
presumption against the recognition of an "agreement" that
would sanction an exercise of discretion at variance from other-
wise-extant expectations of fair and reasonable conduct.
The second, closely related, qualification is implicit in much of
the analysis to this point, but is nonetheless worthy of express
reemphasis here: The burden of expression regarding an agreed
displacement of the external standards of good faith and fair
dealing with respect to a particular discretionary power will fall
to the party seeking to obtain such discretion.296 That is, when
one party seeks to insulate her discretion on a given subject
from subsequent review under the doctrine of good faith perfor-
mance, the burden should be hers to secure a sufficiently ex-
plicit, knowing agreement from the other party on that score.297
293. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (stating that the duty of good faith "directs a court
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are cre-
ated, performed and enforced").
294. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 70, 273-77 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 264-81 and accompanying text (arguing that a good faith limi-
tation on even an express discretionary power applies without the need for any affir-
mative action by the parties).
297. This does not mean that there is a duty of good faith in the negotiation of a
contractual relationship in the first instance. For a comprehensive analysis of the
limited role of good faith and fair dealing in negotiation, see BURToN & ANDERSEN,
supra note 71, at 327-90; E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Prelimi-
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What emerges from the confluence of these considerations is
what might be termed a "burden of bargaining." This burden
proceeds from the prudential notion that the expectations of
good faith performance are so fundamental that any attempt to
deviate from them by agreement should be subject to heightened
obligations of explicitness and prominence.298 When a party
seeks to secure truly unrestricted discretion on a subject, this
burden should be a heavy one indeed. On the level of explicit-
ness, it will require more than a mere agreement that a party
has discretion. To secure a discretionary power insulated from
subsequent review, rather, that party should be required to
negotiate a clear and unambiguous agreement that the subse-
quent exercise of such discretion will not be subject to any exter-
nal standards of reasonable conduct.299 Anything less than an
explicit agreement permitting exercise "for any reason" or "with
or without cause" 00 should not satisfy this exacting standard.01
nary Agreeements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 239-
43 (1987). The duty of good faith performance simply requires that if a party wishes
to secure an agreement at the formation stage that would insulate a future exercise
of a discretionary power from subsequent review, the burden of expression on that
score will be hers.
298. See Foster Enters., Inc. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 421 N.E.2d
1375, 1380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("There cannot be any doubt that a covenant of...
good faith is implied into every contract absent express disavowal.").
299. Similarly, an explicit agreement that an exercise of discretion is to be absolute
and unrestricted also may suffice. See Diamond & Foss, supra note 79, at 626-27
(arguing that a waiver of the obligation of good faith performance should be effective
"[o]nly if the contract unambiguously evidences an intent by the parties to make
such discretion absolute," but intimating, incorrectly in my view, that review of con-
tractual text alone may suffice in this regard).
300. A number of cases have concluded that such language insulated an exercise of
discretion from external standards of reasonableness. Unfortunately, most have done
so without an analysis of the context in which such a discretionary clause came into
being. See, e.g., Burnette Techno-Metrics, Inc. v. TSI Inc., 44 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding that a clause expressly permitting termination without cause preclud-
ed assertion of claim based on duty of good faith); Samuels v. Old Kent Bank, No.
96 C 6667, 1997 WL 458434, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1997) (involving clause permit-
ting termination "at any time at the will of either party"); Infomax Office Sys., Inc.
v. MBO Binder & Co. of Am., 976 F. Supp. 1247, 1249-50 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (involv-
ing clause permitting termination without cause); Implement Serv., Inc. v. Tecumseh
Prods. Co., 726 F. Supp. 1171, 1179-80 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (finding that a clause per-
mitting termination "for any reason or without any reason whatsoever" precluded
breach of good faith claim). Cf Bertera Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,
992 F. Supp. 64, 73 (D. Mass. 1998) (interpreting Michigan law as holding that the
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The burden of bargaining should not end, however, with a
reliance on text alone. The duty of good faith performance also
implies that any "explicit" displacement of its strictures must
reflect a sufficiently informed agreement of the other party. °2
That is, inspired by the goal of protecting fundamental expecta-
tions, the presumptive nature of the duty should also require
that attention be drawn to any attempt to insulate a future
exercise of discretion from external review. This conception of
the force of good faith resonates with what Karl Llewellyn once
generally referred to as an obligation of "attention-calling." °3
Llewellyn argued that the law should require a party to call
affirmative attention to any desire to contract at variance from
extant community (in specific, commercial) standards of fairness
and reasonableness."' For the law to permit otherwise, he rea-
soned, would result in the frustration of the actual expectations
that may arise in the relational and commercial context."0 5
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not attach when bargaining parties
have "unmistakably expressed" their rights regarding a specific discretionary power).
301. Even a clause permitting an action in one party's "sole" discretion should not
satisfy the required threshold of clarity. Such a provision may indeed indicate that
the decision on exercise of the related contractual power is to be made solely by
that party. As Professors Diamond and Foss have correctly observed, however, such
a "sole discretion" clause remains ambiguous on the essential issue of whether that
party may disregard the expectations of the other party in doing so. See Diamond &
Foss, supra note 79, at 627 n.199; see also Travelers Intl v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 41 F.3d 1570, 1575 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding sole discretion clause subject to duty
of good faith exercise); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d
1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1988) (same). The proper focus here, in other words, is not
merely on a party's "discretion," but rather on an explicit agreement that the rea-
sons for the exercise of the discretion will not be subject to subsequent review under
external standards of "reasonableness." See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at
51-52 (emphasizing the importance of the reasons for exercising discretion for good
faith performance).
302. See Llewellyn, supra note 288, at 217 (urging a requirement of "attention-call-
ing" when a party seeks to deviate from extant commercial standards).
303. See id.
304. See id. (arguing that "[a]ttention must be called to a desire to contract at
material variance from the accepted commercial pattern of contract or use of lan-
guage") (emphasis omitted); see also Slawson, supra note 227, at 56 (emphasizing the
importance of the "conspicuousness" of agreements under the Code and observing
that "tihe conspicuousness of something deals with the likelihood of a party having
been aware of it"); infra notes 318-25 (analyzing the conspicuousness requirement
regarding the analogical case of exculpatory clauses in contracts).
305. See PEB CoMENTARY No. 10, supra note 15 (observing that Karl Llewellyn
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An attempt to contract at variance from otherwise-extant
standards of good faith and fair dealing should be subject to no
less exacting standards. Thus, when one party seeks to obtain
such insulated discretion on a given subject, the burden should
be hers to draw affirmative attention to the displacement of the
external standards of fair and reasonable conduct in the exercise
of that discretion. In this way, the burden of bargaining will
operate to ensure against the factual predicate on which subse-
quent surprise (that is, a frustration of reasonable expectations)
would be based. °6 It is also for this reason that a clause grant-
ing a party simple "discretion" alone is insufficient to eliminate
the expectations protected by the duty of good faith perfor-
mance.
307
An illustration should aid in the understanding of this burden
of bargaining in action. Consider the case of Larese v.
Creamland Dairies, Inc.108 At issue in Larese was the common
claim that a franchisor's refusal to consent to an assignment of
the franchise violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing.0 9
The franchisor's response also was the customary one: It cited
an express clause in the franchise agreement that required its
"written consent" for such assignments. 10
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Larese is significant for its
recognition of the bargaining obligations that attend any at-
tempted displacement of the good faith limitations on discretion-
ary powers.3 ' The court first acknowledged that a contract pro-
vision may indeed grant "an absolute right to refuse to consent,"
as long as "such an agreement [is] freely negotiated."3 '2 It none-
"recognized that parties develop expectations over time against the background of
commercial practices and that if commercial law fails to account for those practices,
it will cut against the parties' actual expectations"); see also Patterson, supra note
48, at 199-200 (providing the source of these statements of the PEB).
306. Even here, however, expectations created in the course of performance as a
result of waivers or estoppels may operate to (re)impose such limitations on the
exercise of discretion. See infra note 355 and accompanying text,
307. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
308. 767 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1985).
309. See id. at 716-17.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 717-18.
312. Id. at 718. At the time of the decision in 1985, the court first had to endorse
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theless quickly concluded that the simple clause requiring con-
sent for assignment at issue in that case did not satisfy that
standard. 1 ' To the contrary, the court viewed the duty of good
faith as fulfilling a more important notification function for the
other party. To achieve an "absolute right" of discretion insulat-
ed from the obligations of reasonable conduct, the court rea-
soned, "the franchisor must bargain for a provision expressly
granting the right to withhold consent unreasonably, to insure
that the franchisee is put on notice."314
Such is the proper understanding of the obligations imposed
by the doctrine of good faith in the case of discretionary
powers.315 Animated by the goal of protecting against unfair
the now well-accepted proposition that the franchisor-franchisee relationship also is
"one which requires the parties to deal with one another in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner." Id. at 717.
313. See id. at 718.
314. Id. (emphasis added). A few more recent cases have applied similar reasoning.
See, e.g., Kaplan v. First Options.Inc. (In re Kaplan), 143 F.3d 807, 818-19 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that although the terms of a margin account agreement left "great
room for discretion," the agreements "[did] not give [the defendant] the right to act
in bad faith or in a commercially unreasonable manner"); Sterling Nafl Mortgage
Co. v. Mortgage Corner, Inc., 97 F.3d 39, 42-44 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a clause
providing simply that a party "may" take a certain action was not a grant of abso-
lute discretion to preclude application of duty of good faith); Duffield v. First Inter-
state Bank, N-A, 13 F.3d 1403, 1405 (10th Cir. 1993) (observing that the duty of
good faith set forth in UCC section 1-203 "on its face appears to apply in all situa-
tions-including when a contract's express terms do not limit either party's right to
act unreasonably").
315. Support for this approach also is found in the approach of a number of courts
to clauses requiring the consent of a lessor for an assignment of a lease. A solid mi-
nority in the case law now holds that a duty of reasonable conduct applies to the
exercise of a discretionary power to withhold such consent. See, e.g., Warner v.
Konover, 553 A.2d 1138, 1140-41 (Conn. 1989) (holding that a landlord must exercise
his "discretion in a manner consistent with good faith and fair dealing"); Kendall v.
Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 842 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (surveying authorities
and concluding that landlord's discretion was subject to duty of good faith and fair
dealing); Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc. 427 N.W.2d 50, 53-55 (Neb.
1988) (following Kendall); see also Castle v. McKnight, 866 P.2d 323, 326 (N.M.
1993) (following Kendall). But cf. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev.
Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 727 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the reasonableness standard of
Kendall does not apply when a clause explicitly grants the lessor the right to refuse
consent for the specific reason in dispute). For a comprehensive analysis of this
issue, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to
Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REV. 751
(1988).
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surprise (justified expectations), the presumptive nature of the
duty of good faith performance fulfills what is in effect a cau-
tionary function.3 16 It does so by requiring that attention be
drawn to any attempt to exclude otherwise applicable expecta-
tions of fair and reasonable conduct.
A necessary corollary of this directive is a consideration of the
context in which even explicit contractual text came into
being.317 Thus, for example, an inconspicuous clause in the
boilerplate of a standard form (taken alone) rarely will satisfy
the attention-drawing obligation imposed on a party seeking in-
sulated discretion on a given subject.3 18 In such a case, even an
explicit "for any reason" clause will be inherently ambiguous on
the essential issue of whether such an attempted displacement
of good faith limitations on discretion reflects an actual, knowing
agreement of the other party.319 In the case of a contract that
arises from express bargaining between sophisticated parties, in
contrast, such an explicit clause granting unrestricted discretion
may be effectively dispositive on this score. 20
316. Lon Fuller first articulated the concept of a "cautionary function" in his classic
analysis of the functions of legal formalities. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941). For a more complete review of Professor
Fuller's insights, see infra note 339.
317. See supra notes 210-14, 234-35 and accompanying text (discussing the required
consideration of the context in interpretive inquiries).
318. Cf. Llewellyn, supra note 288, at 217 (noting with regard to his "attention-call-
ing" requirement the "strikingly diverse significance" of a negotiated term as com-
pared to a term in a form contract "to which the attention of the other party is
never directed").
319. For cases addressing such "for any reason" clauses, see supra note 300.
320. In rare cases, an exclusion of the good faith limitations may arise when a
party is able to establish that the contract at issue by its very nature suggests an
actual agreement granting an unrestricted discretionary right. This is the standard
explanation for removing "demand notes" from the scope of the duty of good faith.
See U.C.C. § 1-208 cmt. (1995) (stating that a duty of good faith in the exercise of a
discretionary right of acceleration "obviously . .. has no application to demand in-
struments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time with or without
reason"); supra note 143 (providing case law to this effect). In such rare cases, how-
ever, the burden of attention-drawing will gain particular significance. That burden
may well require not only an explicit demand clause but also proof that the right to
demand immediate payment actually was brought to the attention of the borrower in
the course of contract formation. In other words, in the absence of such satisfaction
of the burden of bargaining, even here the required consideration of the context of
the parties' relationship required by the Code's flexible concept of agreement may re-
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To be sure, the applicable standard here will remain an objec-
tive one. Nonetheless, the application of the "attention-drawing"
obligation must be calibrated to the particular contractual rela-
tionship at issue. A negotiated deal between sophisticated par-
ties may require little (or no) affirmative actions from the party
seeking discretion, beyond the appropriately explicit agreement
on her unrestricted discretion. In the case of a repeat player
dealing with a party who rarely is in the relevant contractual
setting, in contrast, the burden of bargaining may require a
particularly clear and conspicuous "for any reason" clause, and
in extreme cases perhaps even an affirmative disclosure of the
existence of the otherwise-applicable obligation of good faith
itself.3 21
One should emphasize here, finally, that a failure to satisfy
the burden of bargaining does not lead to the conclusion of an
actual breach of the duty of good faith performance. It simply
means that the party with discretion has failed to satisfy the
strict conditions for a sufficiently explicit and informed agree-
ment insulating the later exercise of such discretion from exter-
nal review. 22 The consequence, in other words, is that the exer-
cise of the discretion will be subject to the full force of the rea-
veal protected expectations of good faith conduct. See Patterson, supra note 48, at
186-202 (elaborating on this point in connection with the acceleration of performance
obligations); see also Bank One, Texas, NA v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 31-32 (5th Cir.
1992) (concluding, after reviewing contextual evidence, that a promissory note with a
"demand" clause was subject to the duty of good faith); Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821
F.2d 9, 13-16 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); PATrERSON, supra note 50, at 125-55 (discussing
"failure to fund" cases).
321. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
322. This is the point of UCC section 1-208. Although that provision imposes a
good faith limitation even on a discretionary right of acceleration, it states that the
burden of establishing an actual breach of the duty in the specific factual circum-
stances of each case is on the dependent party. See U.C.C. § 1-208 ("The burden of
establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised."); see also U.C.C. § 2A-109 (stating the same rule for an exercise of a
discretionary power to accelerate lease obligations, although switching the burden of
establishing in the context of consumer transactions). The comment to section 1-208
further states that the section "obviously ... has no application to ... obligations
whose very nature permits call at any time with or without reason." U.C.C. § 1-208
cmt. The comment fails to state, however, which party has the burden of proof on
whether an obligation is of this nature (and thus displaces the duty of good faith in
its entirety). That is the point of the burden of expression discussed in the text.
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sonable expectations protected by the duty of good faith perfor-
mance. The other party will then bear the burden of establishing
that the particular exercise of discretion at issue (failure to con-
sent to assignment, unexpected termination, etc.) frustrated the
protected expectations that arose around the formation of the
parties' relationship, 2 ' as influenced by the extant community
standards of reasonableness and fair dealing."
The express terms of the parties' contract will remain an
important consideration, of course, in influencing the reason-
ableness of the other party's expectations. The important mes-
sage here is that a failure to satisfy the burden of bargaining
will mean that the other party may well have protected expecta-
tions as to an exercise of discretion, even in the case of an other-
wise unrestricted contractual power. 25
2. Examining Parallels to Other Burdens of Expression in
Contract Law
The "burden of bargaining" in the context of the duty of good
faith also is consonant with broader conceptions of the burden of
expression in contract law. In a variety of contexts, the law
imposes a heightened burden of negotiation or explicitness in
drafting in situations in which one party has control over the
definition of contractual obligations. Consider as a prominent
example the established precept that a writing is to be inter-
preted against its drafter (the rule of contra preferentem)."2 '
323. See supra notes 209-19, 226-43 and accompanying text. In the rare cases in
which it remains relevant, the applicable standard under the Code may be simply
the minimalist duty of "honesty in fact" in the exercise of such discretion. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 1-208 (imposing a subjective standard of good faith for "at will" and like
clauses permitting the acceleration of performance obligations). But see supra notes
90-102 and accompanying text (discussing the decreasing relevance of this subjective
standard of good faith); supra note 320 (noting that protected reasonable expecta-
tions may exist even in such a case).
324. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also BURTON & ANDERSEN,
supra note 71, at 107-08 (agreeing that the party claiming an actual breach of the
duty of good faith bears the burden of proof in this regard, although not discussing
the burden of expression for a complete displacement of the external standards of
reasonableness at the time of contract formation).
325. For an examination of reasonable expectations analysis, see supra notes 209-43
and accompanying text.
326. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 206 (1981) (stating that among
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Underlying this rule is the normative concern that a party with
control over the articulation of an agreement "may leave mean-
ing deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a later date what
meaning to assert."327 Similar concerns animate the related issue
of the treatment of surprise terms in standardized forms not
subject to negotiation between the parties.2 In this case as well,
the law will refuse to give effect to those terms in standard
forms that are beyond the reasonable expectations of the adher-
ing party.3
29
The effect in each of these examples is to protect reasonable
expectations of a party when the party in control of the articula-
tion of the parties' contractual obligations fails to secure a suffi-
ciently explicit, informed agreement to the contrary.3 Certainly,
reasonable meanings of a contract term "that meaning is generally preferred which
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing other-
wise proceeds"). This rule has been applied repeatedly in the case law. See, e.g.,
Caidwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 973-74 (D.N.J. 1997); In re Riconda, 688
N.E.2d 248, 253 (N.Y. 1997).
327. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 206 cmt. a; cf. Charny, supra note 247,
at 1855-56 (arguing that the contra preferentem rule should apply "where it can
serve to supplement a strong duty to explain the force of terms").
328. See Dugan, supra note 285, at 13-28.
329. See, e.g., American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1996); Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d 813, 824 (Ct. App. 1996); see also Dugan, supra note 285 (analyzing the role of
good faith in the interpretation of standard form contracts); Slawson, supra note 227,
at 23-31, 64-70 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the "reasonable expectations"
approach to standard form contracts); id. at 31-46 (canvassing the prominent ap-
proaches to the treatment of standard forms). The Second Restatement provides a
more limited approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (stating that
where a party utilizing a standardized contract "has reason to believe that the party
manifesting... assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement"); see also Slawson, supra
note 227, at 60-64 (criticizing the Second Restatements requirement that the using
party have "reason to believe" that the other would not have assented).
330. It is for this reason that the contra preferentem rule does not apply if the
drafter can establish that the other party was informed of, or otherwise
knowledgeable concerning, the provision in dispute. See United States v. Continental
Oil Co., 237 F. Supp. 294, 298 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (noting "the exception to the gen-
eral rule that a writing is construed most strongly against the draftsman when the
words involved are the common language of both parties or the contract is the joint
effort of the attorneys and technicians for both sides"), affd, 364 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.
1966); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del.
1985) (explaining that there is no reason to construe a contract against the drafts-
man where all parties are knowledgeable); Wall v. Firelands Radiology, Inc. 666
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the duty of good faith performance stakes a claim to no less of
an increased burden of expression on the party with actual con-
trol over the content of the performance obligations themselves.
Indeed, contract law already imposes a heightened burden of
expression in the closely analogous setting of exculpatory clauses
in contracts. The effect of such clauses is to relieve a contracting
party in advance of responsibility for its own negligent conduct.
Such clauses, in other words, seek to insulate a party's future
conduct from review under the external standards of culpability
otherwise imposed by law, a consequence the Texas Supreme
Court has described as "an extraordinary shifting of risk."
131
Precisely because of this, common-law courts have long required
that such exculpatory clauses be not only explicit, but also
"clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous." 32 The
purpose of the conspicuousness requirement, in particular, is to
put the dependent party on "fair notice" of the risks of permit-
ting the beneficiary to act in the future without fear of liability
for its own negligence.3 3
N.E.2d 235, 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (same).
331. Dresser Indus. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 507-511 (Tex. 1993).
332. Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. 1996) (en
banc); see also Kissick v. Schmierer, 816 P.2d 188, 191 (Alaska 1991) (holding with
regard to exculpatory clauses that "to be enforced the intent to release a party from
liability for future negligence must be conspicuously and unequivocally expressed");
Leon v. Family Fitness Ctr. (No. 107), Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 923, 925 (Ct. App.
1998) (holding that an exculpatory clause "should be placed in a position which
compels notice and must be distinguished from other sections of the document'....
[It] is unenforceable if not distinguished from other sections . . . [or] if not likely to
attract attention because it is placed in the middle of a document" (quoting Conser-
vatorship of Estate of Link, 205 Cal. Rptr. 513, 515 (Ct. App. 1984))); Gross v.
Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) ("[]t has been repeatedly emphasized that
unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an excul-
patory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negli-
gent acts."); Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 507-09 (describing the requirements that
the exculpatory intent must be expressed "in specific terms within the four corners
of the contract" and that it be done "conspicuously"); Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553
A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988) ("[A] greater degree of clarity is necessary to make [an]
exculpatory clause effective than would be required for other types of contract provi-
sions.").
333. See Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 507-09 (discussing the "fair notice" require-
ment for exculpatory clauses).
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A heightened burden of expression applies even for the nega-
tion of certain significant "implied" terms such as usages of
trade and courses of dealing. Recall that under the contextual
approach of the Code, these implied terms set the foundational
context for the interpretation of commercial relationships.
Given this essential role, the Code provides that such terms will
take effect unless they are "carefully negated."
33 5
Support for a heightened burden of expression in the context
of the duty of good faith performance can also be found in the
somewhat unexpected source of some advocates of an economic
analysis of contract law. Professors Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner, for example, have suggested the notion of a "penalty
default" as a tool for protecting against "strategic!' contractual
behavior.3 6 Professors Ayres and Gertner offer this concept as a
challenge to the accepted view among efficiency theorists that, in
filling gaps in incomplete contracts, decisionmakers should
choose the default rule that a majority of transactors "would
have contracted for" if they could bargain free of all transaction
costs.
3 3 7
334. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. Under similar reasoning, UCC
section 2-316(2) requires that a written disclaimer of statutory warranties must be
"conspicuous." See U.C.C. § 2-316(2); see also id. § 1-102(10) (defining "conspicuous").
335. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1995); see also Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that even an express price term
was subject to a contrary usage of trade that was not carefully negated); Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 173 A.2d 780, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1961) (holding that an express term did not "carefully negateD" a usage of trade
because it did not specifically refer to the usage itself). Another prominent example
is the right of a seller to cure under UCC section 2-508. The comments to section 1-
203 expressly identify that right as a "particular application[]" to the "general princi-
ple" of good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. The comments to section 2-508 then state
that the seller's right to cure will apply unless there is a "deliberate inclusion" of a
contrary provision in the parties' contract. See id. § 2-508 cmt. 2; ef id. § 2-309
cmt. 3 (stating with regard to the timing of delivery and shipment that "[tihe appli-
cable principles ...make it clear that surprise is to be avoided . . . and notice or
negotiation to reduce the uncertainty to certainty is to be favored").
336. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 95.
337. As examples of the "would have wanted" school, Professors Ayres and Gertner
cite some of the leading scholars in the law and economics field. See Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 13, at 89-90 nn.19-21 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW 322 (3d ed. 1986); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent
Conueyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
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Professors Ayres and Gertner suggest, in contrast, that in
some situations the law would better serve the interests of the
parties by setting default rules that create incentives to bargain
for at least one of the parties.338 Such "penalty defaults" are par-
ticularly appropriate, they urge, when a relatively better in-
formed party has an opportunity to take strategic advantage of
contractual gaps and ambiguities (so-called "strategic incom-
pleteness"). 3 9 To limit such behavior, a penalty default, if prop-
erly structured, will induce the more knowledgeable party to
reveal relevant information in the course of satisfying the condi-
tions for contracting around the default." °
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983)); see also POSNER,
supra note 125, at 92-94 (discussing the grounds for using efficiency analysis to fill
gaps in contracts); Charny, supra note 247, at 1840-48 (discussing the efficiency
grounds for judicial imposition of such hypothetical bargains).
338. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91.
339. See id. at 94. It is interesting to note the parallel here with the normative
foundation for the contra preferentem rule discussed above. See supra notes 326-27
and accompanying text (noting the concern that a drafter may leave a term deliber-
ately ambiguous with an intent to decide at a later date what meaning to assert).
There are also similarities between this approach and Lon Fuller's classic examina-
tion of the functions of legal formalities. Indeed, explicitly following on Fuller's anal-
ysis, Ayres and Gertner suggest that the necessary and sufficient conditions for con-
tracting around default rules may serve "evidentiary," "cautionary," and "channeling"
functions. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 124. A properly structured penalty
default will serve an evidentiary function, they argue, by encouraging the disclosure
of relevant information to the courts and the parties through the contract itself. See
id. At the same time, such a required disclosure (as appropriate, even of the exis-
tence of the default rule itself) will fulfill a cautionary function. That is, by requir-
ing disclosure of necessary information, the penalty default will protect the other
party from uninformed and incautious decisions in the contracting process. See id.
(noting, importantly, that "[tlo caution is to give information"); Fuller, supra note
316, at 801 (contending that legal formalities ensure sufficient reflection before par-
ties enter into binding contractual relationships). Finally, Professors Ayres and
Gertner argue that an information-enhancing default rule can serve what Lon Fuller
termed a "channeling function." This function stimulates transactors to sort them-
selves into recognizable groups, differentiated, for example, by their reliance on legal
versus nonlegal enforcement mechanisms for their agreements. See Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 13, at 124-25; Fuller, supra note 316, at 800-01.
340. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91 ("Penalty defaults are designed to
give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default
rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer."); cf
Charny, supra note 247, at 1859-60 (arguing that if usages of trade and customary
terms are efficient, "then adjudicators, in reconstructing the bargain as a matter of
interpretation, should place extra constraints on the ability of the parties to modify
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Even if one were to view discretionary contractual powers
solely through an efficiency lens, 1 there may be a compelling
argument for a heightened burden of expression for any attempt
to "contract around" the protections afforded by the duty of good
faith performance.3 42 Although the doctrine of good faith perfor-
mance is not so limited, the risk of strategic conduct created by
discretionary contractual powers is fairly one of the concerns
that animates the imposition of good faith limitations in the first
instance." Properly appreciated, this concern is simply part of
the broader observation that the duty of good faith performance
protects against the frustration of the other party's reasonable
expectations as to the future exercise of such discretion.3
[the] customary terms").
341. A number of scholars have suggested that the duty of good faith performance
may be an "efficient" background rule for contractual relationships. See, e.g., BURTON
& ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 58-60 (agreeing that the duty of good faith may pro-
mote efficiency by relieving the parties of the costs of investigation and negotiation);
Fischel, supra note 125, at 140-41 (arguing that a properly structured good faith
performance rule will permit parties to avoid the costs of detailed drafting). The
contractual duty of good faith, however, does not depend solely on such a justifica-
tion. See supra notes 206-43 and accompanying text (analyzing, in the context of the
duty of good faith, the propriety of the protection of reasonable expectations aroused
in the formation of a contractual relationship).
342. Admittedly, the "penalty" here is a mild one. The penalty aspect arises from
the fact that the party with discretion (typically the party with the stronger bargain-
ing position) will be subject to the strictures of "reasonableness" in the exercise of
such discretion whenever she fails to secure an explicit agreement from the weaker
party to the contrary. For critical examinations of the value of a broad "penalty
default" approach, see Patterson, supra note 13, at 250-57; W. David Slawson, The
Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 29, 35-38
(1993).
343. In this respect, one may find a degree of congruence between the reasoning of
recent textualists and the broader view of the centrality of reasonable expectations
advanced here. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing the argu-
ments by textualists that the duty of good faith prohibits opportunistic advantage-
taking); supra notes 253-58, 262-63 and accompanying text (arguing that the duty of
good faith protects reasonable expectations even as to the exercise of an apparently
unrestricted discretionary powers). The failure of the textualist approach lies in the
view that this function of good faith only applies in the rare case of a true gap in a
contract. See supra note 181 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 244-63 and
accompanying text (observing that even an otherwise unrestricted discretionary pow-
er does not necessarily reflect an "agreement" between the parties that will not be
subject to the strictures of the duty of good faith performance).
344. See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
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Even viewed in this more limited light, the duty of good faith
performance thus should impose a heightened burden of expres-
sion for the recognition of an agreed exclusion of its normative
force. These heightened conditions should properly include both
a requirement of explicitness and the satisfaction of what is in
effect a cautionary function.345 Their goal is to create incentives
for explicit bargaining and for the disclosure of relevant infor-
mation (including as appropriate the existence of the duty of
good faith itself) whenever a party desires to contract at vari-
ance from otherwise applicable expectations of fair and reason-
able conduct.' The burden in this regard, finally, should appro-
priately fall to the party seeking to obtain such an agreement on
an unrestricted discretionary power. It is this party, after all,
who likely will be the best informed about the circumstances in
which such a discretionary power may become relevant in the
actual performance of the parties' contractual relationship.' 4
345. See supra notes 293-307 and accompanying text. Even in the case of a truly
unrestricted discretionary right, significant nonlegal sanctions may limit "unreason-
able" conduct. See generally Charny, supra note 248 (discussing the force of nonlegal
sanctions such as reputational concerns). Not surprisingly, recent textualist courts
have emphasized the force of such nonlegal enforcement mechanisms in arguing for
a limited understanding of the doctrine of good faith. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Atlantic Tele-Network Co., 946 F.2d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting "the effect of a
concern with reputation in limiting opportunistic behavior by commercial enterprises
which hope that the current contract is not their last"); United States v. Stump
Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1122 (7th Cir. 1990) (making similar ob-
servations); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987) (same).
346. Allan Farnsworth has suggested a similar proposition founded on his notion of
the "burden of expression." Professor Farnsworth argues that in filling contractual
gaps, courts should structure the background rule to put the burden of expression on
the party best able to ensure an accurate expression of the parties' agreement. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 269, at 548 (arguing that "[a] court may . . . consider the
realities of the negotiating and drafting processes and supply a term that will put
the burden of expression on the party that can better cope with it because of bar-
gaining power and drafting skill").
347. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 60 (arguing similarly that the
party best able to assume the costs of negotiation concerning the duty of good faith
performance would be "the discretion-exercising party, who would have far better
information concerning its own alternative opportunities and the probability that a
later opportunity will prove more attractive"). This conclusion should pertain in par-
ticular where the party with discretion is a repeat player dealing with a party who
is not. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 98 ("If one side is repeatedly in the
relevant contractual setting while the other side rarely is, it is a sensible presump-
tion that the former is better informed than the latter.").
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3. The Irreducible Core of the Duty of Good Faith
The above discussion of the power of contracting parties to
define the standards to govern an exercise of discretion requires
a few final observations about the force of good faith. The first is
perhaps the most important: Even an explicit agreement that
satisfies the stringent standards of the burden of bargaining will
be limited to its particular subject matter. That is, even in such
a case the broader, nondisclaimable aspect of the duty of good
faith will prohibit any affirmative actions by a party to pre-
vent or interfere with performance by the other.4 9
Similarly, an unrestricted discretionary power as to one aspect
of the parties' relationship (most notably, a right of termination)
will not displace the duty of good faith performance in other
contexts. A number of courts properly have found a breach of
good faith in this sense when a party with such a discretionary
power engaged in affirmative bad faith conduct prior to,35° or
active deception in connection with,'5
1 its use.352
348. See supra notes 11, 85-86 and accompanying text.
349. See First Texas Say. Assoc. v. Comprop Investment Prop. Ltd., 752 F. Supp.
1568, 1573-74 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (denying summary judgment on breach of good faith
claim based on evidence that a bank in a foreclosure action frustrated performance
of a loan contract by debtor); Ally Gargano/MCA Adver., Ltd. v. Cooke Properties,
Inc., No. 87 Civ. 731, 1989 WL 126066, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1989) (finding a
breach of the duty of good faith in conduct by landlord that frustrated attempts by
tenant to exercise right to sublease premises).
350. See Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587-89 (N.J. 1997)
(affirming a finding of breach of the duty of good faith notwithstanding an explicit
clause permitting termination without cause because of bad faith conduct of defen-
dant prior to termination); Roli-Blue, Inc. v. 69/70th St. Assocs., 506 N.Y.S.2d 159,
161 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that a landlord breached the duty of good faith when
the landlord's "affirmative action . . .render[ed] illegal the contemplated use of the
demised premises" even though contract contained an express disclaimer of a war-
ranty of use).
351. See Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 946-47 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying sum-
mary judgment on breach of good faith claim in spite of an "absolute" right to ter-
minate sales representative, because of allegations that manufacturer engaged in
active deception prior to termination); Travel Servs. Network, Inc. v. Presidential
Fin. Corp., 959 F. Supp. 135, 143-44 (D. Conn. 1997) (concluding that even where a
loan contract permits termination in its sole discretion, a bank could breach duty of
good faith through "active deception" prior to termination); Hentze v. Unverfehrt, 604
N.E.2d 536, 538-40 (IlM. App. Ct. 1992) (holding defendant liable for breach of good
faith despite absolute right of termination because of a variety of bad faith acts,
including deceptive communications, prior to termination).
352. An additional potential function of the duty of good faith is to protect against
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Moreover, an express agreement granting an absolute discre-
tionary power will be subject to review under the unconsciona-
bility doctrine. 353 This is also the proper understanding of the
(somewhat obscure) final proviso of U.C.C. section 1-102(3),
which renders unenforceable even agreed "standards" of good
faith conduct if "manifestly unreasonable."3 ' Like any other
contractual provision, even an otherwise unrestricted discretion-
ary right will also be subject to the limitations that arise
through the force of waivers or estoppels in the course of the
parties' performance.355 Finally, good faith will continue to play
coerced modifications of contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1995) (dispensing with
the requirement of consideration but subjecting a modification to an obligation of
good faith); Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game The-
oretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. L.J. 335, 375-80 (1993). But see Robert A. Hillnan, Contract Modification
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 702-03 (1982)
(arguing that contract modifications under the Second Restatement of Contracts
should be analyzed not under the duty of good faith but rather in terms of economic
duress); Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good
Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 879-80 (1979) (ad-
vancing a similar argument for the Code).
353. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 65 (noting the distinction between
good faith analysis and the unconscionability doctrine); see also Burnette Techno-
Metrics, Inc. v. TSI Inc., 44 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1994) (observing that a clause
permitting termination without cause may be subject to unconscionability analysis);
Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 760, 761-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (af-
firming a conclusion that an at-will termination clause in a distribution agreement
was unconscionable); U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (imposing an obligation to give reasonable
notice of termination but stating that "an agreement dispensing with notification is
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable"). Unlike good faith analysis, the
unconscionability doctrine also focuses on the absence of meaningful choice at the
time the contract was made. See U.C.C. § 3-302; FARNSWORTH, supra note 269, at
332-35.
354. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("[T]he parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of [good faith] is to be measured if such stan-
dards are not manifestly unreasonable").
355. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 71, at 69 ("It should ... go without say-
ing that express terms may be negated by subsequent events giving rise to waivers
and estoppels."). As one Court noted in a case involving a long-term relationship, an
express termination provision
did not extinguish the context of prior dealings between the parties.
These dealings might have legitimately led [the plaintiff] to expect that
[defendant] might negotiate a new agreement with her, or that it might
arrange to buy her out at a fair price, or that it might allow her suffi-
cient time to negotiate a sale of the business to a third party.
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a significant role in filling true gaps in incomplete contracts.
35 8
Indeed, the significance of this function of the duty of good faith
will grow with the length of the parties' contractual relation-
ship,3 57 as the corrosive effect of time reveals such gaps in their
express deal with increasing frequency.
CONCLUSION
"The half truths of one generation," Benjamin Cardozo warned
early in this century, "tend at times to perpetuate themselves in
the law as the whole truth of another, when constant repetition
brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are
disregarded or forgotten.3 58 In the case of the new textualist
approach to the contractual duty of good faith, this phenomenon
threatens to occur in substantially less than a generation. Al-
though asserted with conviction only a decade ago, in recent
years a rising chorus of courts has chanted the refrain that no-
tions of "good faith" and "fair dealing" have no role to play in the
face of an express contractual power.
This common repetition of the textualist creed increasingly
has obscured important qualifications. The duty of good faith
fulfills its essential function in protecting the reasonable expec-
tations that arise in the formation of a contractual relationship.
What is now commonly overlooked in the mechanical application
of the textualist approach is that such protected expectations
can exist even in the case of a discretionary power otherwise left
unrestricted on the face of contractual text. That is, contrary to
the animating tenet of textualism, the presumption of a good
Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1217-18 (Vt. 1993).
356. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
357. One of the best descriptions of the increased significance of this function of
good faith in long-term contracts comes, ironically, from Judge Richard Posner's
opinion in Market Street Associates Limited Partnership u. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir. 1991). Judge Posner observed that "[als performance unfolds" in such relation-
ships "circumstances change, often unforeseeably, the explicit terms of the contract
become progressively less apt to the governance of the parties' relationship; and the
role of implied conditions-and with it the scope and bite of the good faith doc-
trine-grows." Id. at 595-96.
358. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174
(N.Y. 1927).
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faith limitation on a discretionary power relieves the dependent
party of any obligation to negotiate corresponding express limi-
tations on such discretion.
There is indeed merit in the view that informed parties should
be able to confer on one or both of them a specific discretionary
power whose exercise is insulated from review under the exter-
nal standards of "fair" and "reasonable" conduct. The law should
not easily assume, however, that one party would put itself at
the mercy of another in such a fashion. Properly appreciated,
the doctrine of good faith performance reflects this essential,
prudential notion; it does so by imposing a heightened burden of
expression for bargaining around its strictures with respect to
discretionary contractual powers.
This "burden of bargaining" at the core of the duty of good
faith extends beyond a requirement of explicitness in the grant-
ing of contractual discretion. Inspired by the goal of protecting
against unfair surprise, it also implies a duty to draw attention
to any attempt to contract at variance from fundamental expec-
tations of good faith and fair dealing. A failure to satisfy this
heightened burden of expression will mean that a party's exer-
cise of discretion in performance will be subject to the full force
of the reasonable expectations protected by the duty of good
faith performance, even in the case of an otherwise unrestricted
contractual power.
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